United Nations S/2005/596

Security Council

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20 September 2005

Original: English

Twenty-sixth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

I. Introduction

1. By its resolution 1610 (2005) of 30 June 2005, the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) for a final period of six months, until 31 December 2005. In that resolution, the Council welcomed my intention to keep the security, political, humanitarian and human rights situation in Sierra Leone under close review and to report regularly to it. The present report is submitted pursuant to that request and provides an assessment of the security situation and the overall progress made in the drawdown of the Mission since my last report, of 26 April (S/2005/273) and the addendum to it of 28 July (S/2005/273/Add.2).

II. Security situation

2. The overall security situation in Sierra Leone has remained generally calm and stable during the period under review. Furthermore, the Government of Sierra Leone has taken further steps towards assuming full responsibility for the maintenance of security, thus further contributing to the consolidation of peace in the country.

3. Despite funding shortfalls, the performance of the Office of National Security has continued to improve, as has, in particular, its coordination capacity. The national security structure has been consolidated country-wide by means of the provincial and district security committees, which bring together key local officials, including local councils, commanders of the Sierra Leone police and the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces.

4. Despite the current favourable security environment in the country, serious challenges remain, which include the limited progress in addressing the root causes of the conflict such as corruption, governance, widespread poverty, including massive youth unemployment, and the resulting public discontent. These represent a major threat to stability in Sierra Leone.

5. While there are currently no external security threats to the country, the security situation in the subregion remains fragile, as there is a risk of spillover effects of the increased tensions in Liberia owing to the forthcoming elections, to be held in October and uncertainty over the political future in Côte d'Ivoire and

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Guinea. Furthermore, the Governments of Guinea and Sierra Leone need to urgently resolve the territorial dispute over the Yenga village border area in the east, which remains a potential catalyst for trouble.

6. The situation in Liberia has continued to stabilize and the preparations for the October elections are proceeding peacefully. However, the situation in the border areas with Sierra Leone remains of concern and continues to be jointly monitored by UNAMSIL and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).

III. Implementation of the drawdown plan

7. The phased withdrawal of UNAMSIL from Sierra Leone is on course for completion on 20 December. The force, which currently stands at some 3,200 military personnel, including three infantry battalions, and supporting arms and headquarters staff, will commence its withdrawal in mid-September. The withdrawal will be carried out in three phases, including the closure of the United Nations military observers' team sites, withdrawal of the UNAMSIL force and the closure of UNAMSIL force headquarters. The Ghanaian battalion will depart by the end of September. The Pakistani battalion will be repatriated by the end of October, and the Nigerian battalion, supporting arms and services, by 15 December. The last UNAMSIL headquarters staff officers are scheduled to depart from Sierra Leone on 20 December.

8. In support for the Mission's drawdown, UNAMSIL, together with other stakeholders, has designed a public information strategy to raise awareness about the achievements of the Mission and its exit strategy from the country. To that end, a series of activities are being undertaken through the local media and international correspondents on the ground. The media campaign is aimed at raising awareness in the local and international media of the United Nations continuing commitment to Sierra Leone, as well as the mandate and functions of the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone referred to below.

9. The current UNAMSIL civilian police strength stands at 62 personnel. By December 2005, the strength of UNAMSIL civilian police will be reduced to 34 personnel, who will be deployed in Freetown, Lungi airport, Makeni and Bo to cover the western area, and the northern, southern and eastern regions.

IV. Establishment of a United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone

10. By its resolution 1620 (2005) of 31 August, the Security Council established the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) for an initial period of 12 months, beginning on 1 January 2006. To implement this decision of the Security Council, a number of steps are being taken, including the preparation of the budget proposal, staffing, logistical and security arrangements for the establishment of the Office and other arrangements.

V. Progress on benchmarks for the residual presence of the Mission in Sierra Leone

A. Strengthening the capacity of the security sector

11. The security forces of the Government of Sierra Leone have now an enhanced capacity to contain and deal satisfactorily with potential internal threats. They may however be challenged by multiple outbreaks of widespread civil unrest, resulting from a worsening socio-economic situation. Further enhancement of the security sector will depend on the Government's effective funding, strategic planning and management of the security sector.

12. The armed forces continue to face considerable constraints, including in communications equipment and logistical support, particularly with regard to the provision of rations and fuel, as well as ammunition, medical supplies, water and uniforms. In a welcome development, in response to my appeal for support for the armed forces, on 18 August, the Governments of India and Sierra Leone signed an agreement providing for the construction of 400 prefabricated housing barracks for the Sierra Leone Armed Forces. While this important gesture will alleviate to some extent the shortage of accommodation for the armed forces, the overall shortage of accommodation remains a serious problem, which negatively affects the morale of the armed forces. In addition, while the Sierra Leone Armed Forces have received 260 trucks generously donated by the Government of Switzerland, and may receive additional vehicles from donors to further enhance mobility, the use of the armed forces transport fleet is hampered by chronic shortages of fuel.

13. Public confidence in the police has notably increased over the past months. However, the Sierra Leone police have not received any further international assistance over the reporting period. A lack of accommodation in the provinces has continued to hamper the effective deployment of police personnel throughout the country.

14. UNAMSIL civilian police have to date supported the recruitment, training and deployment of some 3,000 Sierra Leone police officers, bringing the current strength of the Sierra Leone police to 8,532 personnel. UNAMSIL civilian police have also continued to assist with the recruitment and training of staff of the immigration and corrections departments. Almost 500 recruits are currently undergoing training at the Hastings Police Training School. Once these trainees graduate on 10 September 2005, the police force will have some 9,000 personnel, which still falls short of the target figure of 9,500 officers. The renovation of the police regional training centres at Makeni, Bo and Kenema has been completed and barracks have been constructed at those centres to accommodate the participants.

15. UNAMSIL civilian police training efforts are expected to continue and the recruitment of a new batch of some 500 additional candidates for the September police training intake is in progress. Training is also under way to enhance the supervisory skills of Sierra Leone police middle-level management personnel. In addition, some 3,400 police personnel have undergone various in-service training programmes and development courses, including computer training. This achievement was made possible thanks to the support of Sierra Leone's partners, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Kingdom Department for International Development, which provided funds and other inputs.

B. Consolidation of State authority

16. During the period under review, further progress continued to be made in the consolidation of State authority. In line with its policy of decentralization, the Government took further steps to devolve major State administrative services in the areas of education, health and agriculture to the local councils. With the assistance of the World Bank, local councils have established their basic administrative and financial systems. While local councils are now functioning, however, their capacity to deliver effective services to the local population remains insufficient, owing to the lack of qualified personnel, financial and logistical constraints, and a poor road network. Nonetheless, given the fact that the system of local government was reinstituted in the country only in 2004, after being in abeyance for 32 years, the advancement of local capacity for resource mobilization and the provision of services is encouraging.

17. In the meantime, the relations between local councils and the traditional chiefdom system are evolving satisfactorily. There is a need, however, to introduce appropriate legislation to harmonize these relations and clarify respective responsibilities, including the control and apportionment of financial resources.

18. UNAMSIL has continued to provide assistance to the Government of Sierra Leone in resolving chiefdom disputes over boundaries and other issues. The Ministry of Local Government and Community Development and local councils, in collaboration with UNAMSIL and civil society organizations, have started a new mediation initiative at the provincial and district level aimed at settling outstanding disputes among chiefdoms by the end of the Mission's mandate.

19. The Government of Sierra Leone, with the support of UNAMSIL, is proceeding with the implementation of the diamond-mining cadastral system launched in December 2004. The establishment of this system is expected to start in Kono in October 2005, and to be expanded later to other diamond-mining areas. By the end of 2004, diamond exports from Sierra Leone totalled $127 million. The diamond exports amounted to some $82 million in the first half of 2005. This exponential growth is believed to be linked to increased Government control over diamond mining and its compliance with the Kimberly Certification Scheme.

20. Nonetheless, the Government will have to continue to deploy considerable efforts to monitor the mines and diamond extraction. While it has deployed monitors in the major diamond-mining areas nationwide, their efficiency remains limited, owing to a lack of transport and other logistical constraints. According to surveys of mining sites conducted by UNAMSIL, more than 50 per cent of diamond mining remains unlicensed, and reports indicate that there is still a considerable degree of illegal diamond smuggling.

VI. Progress in related areas

A. Implementation of the UNAMSIL/United Nations country team transition plan

21. UNAMSIL and the United Nations country team have continued to implement the activities outlined in their joint transition plan aimed at ensuring a seamless

transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding in Sierra Leone, while facilitating the implementation of the Mission's exit strategy. The plan focuses on a number of priority areas, such as further enhancing the security sector, reforming the corrections system, promoting good governance, strengthening the independence of the judiciary, and promoting anti-corruption efforts, as well as restoring public services. It also serves as an important means of preparing the ground in support of the establishment of UNIOSIL.

B. Electoral reform

22. With the support of the Government of Sierra Leone and international partners, progress has been made in restructuring and capacity-building within the National Electoral Commission. This should enable it to organize and conduct credible presidential and parliamentary elections in 2007, which will be a critical landmark in the process of peace consolidation. The appointment of a chairperson for the Commission in May 2005 has boosted its capacity, including through the delimitation of constituencies well before the elections. That appointment and the continued recruitment of new staff should furthermore facilitate the restructuring of the Commission and increase its independence. The Government of Sierra Leone has committed $8 million to the Commission in support of this process. In addition, Sierra Leone's international partners have established a basket fund to mobilize the remaining $18.4 million required to complete the electoral tasks for the conduct of credible elections in 2007.

VII. Regional aspects

23. The Heads of State of the Mano River Union countries, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea, met in Freetown on 28 July to consider a wide range of issues, including subregional peace initiatives, security and development, particularly the revitalization of the Mano River Union Secretariat and the settlement of the Yenga border dispute between Guinea and Sierra Leone. In a communiqué issued at the end of the meeting, the three leaders "reaffirmed their commitment to pursue a brotherly and peaceful solution" to the border issue, consistent with the statement issued at Conakry on 2 September 2004, which provides that "the village of Yenga belongs to the Republic of Sierra Leone". The three leaders further agreed that the border demarcation process would start on 20 August. The summit devoted considerable attention to the promotion of confidence-building measures in border areas, as well as the strengthening of security in the subregion.

VIII. Humanitarian situation

24. Since January 2005, some 5,600 Liberian refugees have been voluntarily repatriated. However, some 48,000 refugees remain in camps in Kenema and Bo. The operations of repatriation convoys have been hampered by bad road conditions, which have been further exacerbated by heavy rains. The World Food Programme is providing food to the refugees in all camps and in transit way stations during repatriation. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) intends to accelerate the voluntary repatriation of Liberian refugees after

the October elections, once the rains have subsided. To this end, from May 2005, UNHCR has been undertaking a verification and return intentions survey of the camp population, the final phase of which commenced in mid-August.

IX. Economic recovery

25. The economic performance of Sierra Leone remained stable and GDP increased to 7.4 per cent in 2004. The sustained GDP growth is supported by the improvement in a number of economic sectors, including agriculture, mining, construction, manufacturing and services. Government finances also improved in 2004, but remained below projections in the first quarter of 2005. High international oil prices, delays in aid disbursements, and incomplete fiscal adjustment continued to affect inflation rates. Although inflation declined to 7.5 per cent at the beginning of the year, as opposed to 14.4 per cent at the end of 2004, it increased to 11.1 per cent at the end of the second quarter of 2005.

26. Despite continuing economic recovery, economic fundamentals remain, however, inadequate. Private sector growth is hampered by a fragile business environment characterized by poor physical and financial infrastructure, small-scale industries with a limited contribution to GDP, and a vast black market. Gross national savings are low, reflecting the depth of poverty in Sierra Leone and the overall weaknesses of financial institutions. This has resulted in limited financing for investments needed for private sector growth, especially small and medium-sized enterprises. The share of GDP devoted to investment was 19.6 per cent in 2004. However, most of the productive investments during the recovery period have been financed from foreign borrowing. It is expected that the Sierra Rutile Limited Company in Moyamba district will commence full operations at the end of 2005, which could boost foreign exchange earnings.

27. Since the postponement of the Consultative Group meeting for Sierra Leone, which was to have been held in June, preparations for the meeting later this year have been ongoing. These have focused on the timing, venue and agenda of the meeting, as well as the establishment of funding instruments such as multi-donor budget support, trust and basket funds, the results framework and the proposal to reform the development assistance partnership framework.

X. Human rights and the rule of law

28. Gains continue to be made with respect to the situation of human rights in the country. The decentralization of Government and the creation of new structures at the district level have enhanced participation in governance and the exercise of political rights at the local level. Political activities including debates among the candidates for the elections to be held in 2007 have remained peaceful so far. There were no reports of arbitrary killings, extrajudicial executions or a pervasive pattern of gross human rights violations except in the area of female genital mutilation, which is widespread in the country. Allegations of violations of other civil and political rights have been routinely investigated and prosecuted, although there were instances where the Government did not act in a timely and transparent manner to investigate them.

29. Nonetheless, as mentioned above, the main root causes of the conflict have not been fully addressed, and there still exist a number of internal human rights challenges which are both causes and effects of the civil conflict. This includes the weakness of the judicial sector, and slow progress in the area of economic, social and cultural rights, which is compounded by a disturbing level of youth unemployment and inadequate basic services.

30. Furthermore, a culture of respect for human rights and basic freedoms has yet to be fully established. Civil society remains weak and does not have the capacity to serve as a countervailing factor for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. In this regard, the UNAMSIL programme of organizing local human rights groups into district-level human rights committees and providing them with training and capacity-building remains on course.

31. Following the visit to Sierra Leone from 13 to 16 July 2005 of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, the Government displayed a renewed interest in the establishment of the National Human Rights Commission. UNAMSIL, with the support of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, is currently working with the Attorney General and the Minister of Justice on the preparatory tasks required for the establishment of the Commission, including the development of a budget, the appointment of the commissioners, and the drafting of the rules of procedure. During her visit to Sierra Leone, the High Commissioner also offered to provide technical assistance for the establishment of the Commission.

32. The final report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission has now been published. On 8 August, UNAMSIL commenced the distribution of the report and sensitization on its findings and recommendations throughout the country. The Government has published a White Paper in response to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission report, which reflected most of its recommendations. However, the Government has yet to embark on concrete action towards implementing them.

33. The weak judicial sector remains of serious concern. A lack of judges, magistrates and prosecuting attorneys, as well as poor working conditions, result in backlogs, delays in trial and prolonged pre-trial detentions. Inadequate salaries of judiciary personnel, particularly judges, are also part of the problem. The justice system for minors requires particular attention, as minors continue to be detained together with adults in police cells and prisons.

34. Many corrections facilities have been renovated since the end of the conflict and are in compliance with minimum international standards. However, in some areas the corrections system continues to be confronted by many problems, relating to access to safe drinking water, adequate health-care facilities and medication, availability of rehabilitation programmes, overcrowding, and the high number of detainees without access to legal counsel.

XI. Gender issues

35. UNAMSIL, in conjunction with United Nations agencies and international and local non-governmental organizations, has conducted considerable work in promoting the rights of women and girls in Sierra Leone. An increasing number of

communities, especially at district centres, continue to be sensitized on the negative effects of gender-based violence through community meetings, workshops and radio programmes.

36. The UNAMSIL Gender Adviser has continued to train senior police officers on gender and women's rights issues. The Sierra Leone police Family Support Unit has been trained by UNAMSIL, the United Kingdom Department for International Development and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). The Unit, together with the UNAMSIL child protection section, is increasingly playing a leading role in investigating cases of violence against women and children. It is also engaged in community education and sensitization through radio and television programmes.

37. The Law Reform Commission, which is tasked with the review of statutory and other laws with a view to reforming, developing, consolidating and codifying those laws, has started consultations to develop a law on domestic violence. The Commission has also produced draft bills on sexual offences, inheritance and succession, and the law on marriage, which have been submitted to the Government for consideration.

XII. HIV/AIDS issues

38. The HIV/AIDS Unit of UNAMSIL, in close collaboration with the force medical cell, has continued to conduct HIV/AIDS sensitization and awareness-training programmes. Troops from Pakistan, Ghana and the Russian Federation Aviation Unit have taken part in such programmes. UNAMSIL, together with the UNAIDS Country Coordinator and the United Nations country team, United Nations agencies and international and local non-governmental organizations, continued to be involved in activities on HIV/AIDS prevention among the various vulnerable groups in the communities, and the national uniformed services. UNAMSIL has also intensified cooperation and collaboration with the National AIDS Secretariat on HIV/AIDS.

XIII. Disciplinary issues

39. UNAMSIL continues to attach high priority to the training of its all civilian and military personnel on the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse, in line with the United Nations policy of zero tolerance. UNAMSIL started a series of training programmes for United Nations Volunteers and national and international personnel, in addition to regular briefings for new arrivals in the Mission area. The Mission also conducted training workshops for the sexual exploitation and abuse focal points established in United Nations agencies operating in the country.

XIV. Mission support issues

40. The administrative component of UNAMSIL continues to plan for the Mission's liquidation and support for UNIOSIL. The facilities that will be required by UNIOSIL are being prepared in close coordination with the United Nations country team. The administrative component is also conducting joint planning with UNMIL for security arrangements for the Special Court for Sierra Leone.

XV. Observations and recommendations

41. The prevailing stable environment in the country has made it possible to achieve further progress towards the consolidation of peace. The Government of Sierra Leone has made commendable efforts towards the consolidation of constitutional order and State authority throughout the country. The effective devolution of State functions through decentralization has ensured that an administrative machinery is now in place, contributing to overall political stability in the country.

42. However, many root causes of the conflict in Sierra Leone are yet to be addressed. The long-term sustainability of the gains achieved so far will require sustained international involvement and support, especially through joint efforts by the United Nations and the donor community. Such involvement will be particularly important for Government programmes aimed at addressing key socio-economic issues, such as poverty, youth unemployment, illiteracy and lack of basic infrastructure. The presence of UNIOSIL will assist the Government in overcoming these challenges.

43. Commendable progress has been made in the diamond-mining sector, particularly in the area of licensing and the substantial increase in the official exports of diamonds. The establishment of a national cadastral system has facilitated the settlement of disputes over mining rights and the boundaries of territorial administrative units, as well as mining sites. The Government should be encouraged to continue to build on initiatives aimed at generating additional revenue, including development projects for local communities, from the vital diamond-mining sector.

44. The summit of the Mano River Union Heads of State and Government held on 28 July in Freetown is a welcome development in the negotiations over the Yenga border dispute. While the leaders of Sierra Leone and Guinea should be commended for the steps they are taking in the search for peace in the subregion, the failure so far to initiate the effective border demarcation process between the two countries, as agreed during the summit, proves that further efforts, including by the international community, are required to help resolve a potential source of conflict. Following my previous report of 26 April, I have instructed my Special Representative to intensify his mediation efforts to assist both Governments in reaching a mutually acceptable solution before the closure of UNAMSIL, if possible.

45. In conclusion, I would like to express appreciation to the countries contributing troops and police to UNAMSIL, as well as to the Economic Community of West African States and donor countries for their unwavering support towards peace consolidation in Sierra Leone. I would like also to pay tribute to my Special Representative, Daudi Ngelautwa Mwakawago, and to all the staff of UNAMSIL and other United Nations programmes and agencies, as well as non-governmental organizations for their important contribution to the peace process in Sierra Leone.

UNAMSIL
Deployment as of
6 September 2005
National capital
Provincial capital
Town, village
International boundary
Provincial boundary
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
GUINEA
SIERRA LEONE
LIBERIA
ATLANTIC OCEAN
Freetown
Goderich
Hastings
York
Waterloo
Wellington
Masiaka
Rogberi
Lunsar
Port Loko
Rokupr
Kambia
Makeni
Binkolo
Kabala
Koidu-Sefadu
Kenema
Bo
Pujehun
Zimmi
Kongo
Bonthe
Sumbuya
Matru
Moyamba
Rotifunk
Bradford
Songo
Magburaka
Matotoka
Kamakwie
Kamalu
Kukuna
Konta
Foredugu
Fandu
Mamou
Medina Oula
Paranah
Falaba
Musaia
Balodia
Gberia Fotombu
Banian
Bendugu
Koinadugu
Bambaya
Yenbeko
Bendou Bodou
Kurubonla
Alikalia
Bendugu
Kayima
Tefeya
Yomadu
Masingbi
Yengema
Njaiama-Sewafe
Njaama
Gandorhun
Koindu
Buedu
Kailahun
Daru
Segbwema
Jct
Tongo
Panguma
Lago
Bendu
Pendembu
Manowa
Boajibu
Falla
Mongeri
Yele
Tunge
Yonibana
Mile 91
Makite
Tolobo
Taiama
Njala
Mano
Sembehun
Shenge
Sieromco
Mokanje
Bumpe
Tikonko
Gbangbatok
Nitti
Kpetewoma
Konibundu
Potoru
Gorahun
Toxpombu
Jaiuru
Bopolu
Bomi Hills
Bong
Kle
Robertsport
Sulima
Bondeja
UNAMSIL
HQ
UNMO HQ
NIGERIA 19
JORDAN
TS-6
Freetown
BANGLADESH
MP PAKISTAN
GHANA 11
NIGERIA 19
PAKISTAN
LOG PAKISTAN
TS-1
TS-4
TS-11
TS-2
TS-8
TS-10
TS-9
RUSSIA
GHANA 11
PAKISTAN 10
LOG PAKISTAN
PAKISTAN
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Cartographic Section

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Security Council

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Letter dated 12 September 2005 from the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the decision adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States at its meeting held at the level of Ministers for Foreign Affairs during its 124th regular session, on 8 September 2005, entitled "Occupation by Iran of the three Arab Islands of the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa in the Arabian Gulf, which belong to the United Arab Emirates" (see annex).

Pursuant to Article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations, I should be grateful if you would arrange for the present letter and its annex to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yahya **Mahmassani**
Ambassador

05-51610 (E) 210905 220905

Annex to the letter dated 12 September 2005 from the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: Arabic]

Occupation by Iran of the three Arab islands of the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa in the Arabian Gulf, which belong to the United Arab Emirates

The Council of the League of Arab States, at the Ministerial level,

Having considered:

- The note of the General Secretariat,
- The preliminary report of the Secretary-General and the activities of the General Secretariat between sessions,
- The recommendation of the Political Affairs Committee,

Guided by the decisions of the previous summit, the last of which was decision 300 of the Algiers Summit, dated 23 March 2005, concerning the occupation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of three Arab islands in the Arabian Gulf, namely the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa, which belong to the United Arab Emirates,

Reaffirming its earlier decisions on the same matter, the most recent of which was decision 6495 of 3 March 2005,

Decides

1. To reaffirm without qualification the absolute sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates over its three islands of the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa and to support all peaceful measures and means adopted by the United Arab Emirates to regain its sovereignty over the occupied islands;

2. To denounce the continued confirmation by the Iranian Government of its occupation of the three islands and its violation of the sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates, which can only undermine security and stability in the region and pose a threat to international peace and security;

3. To condemn the building by the Islamic Republic of Iran of housing facilities to settle Iranians on the three occupied Arab islands;

4. To condemn the Iranian military manoeuvres which include the three occupied islands of the United Arab Emirates, namely the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa, and those islands' territorial waters, airspace, continental shelf and exclusive economic zone, which constitute an inseparable part of the United Arab Emirates; and to request that Iran desist from such violations and acts of provocation, which constitute interference in the internal affairs of an independent, sovereign State, are not conducive to confidence-building, threaten security and stability in the region and endanger the security and safety of regional and international navigation in the Arabian Gulf;

5. To appeal once again to the Iranian Government to end its occupation of the three islands of the United Arab Emirates, refrain from trying to impose a fait accompli by force, desist from establishing any installations there for the purpose of modifying the islands' demographic structure, revoke all measures and remove all installations unilaterally executed by Iran on the three Arab islands, inasmuch as such measures and claims are null and void, lack any legal effect, do not detract from the established right of the United Arab Emirates over its three islands and are acts that run counter to the provisions of international law and the Geneva Conventions of 1949; and to call upon the Iranian Government to adopt peaceful means for resolving the existing dispute over them in accordance with the principles and norms of international law, including agreement to refer the matter to the International Court of Justice;

6. To express the hope that the Islamic Republic of Iran will reconsider its position of rejecting the effort to find a peaceful solution to the issue of the three occupied islands of the United Arab Emirates either through direct, earnest negotiations or through recourse to the International Court of Justice;

7. To call upon Iran to translate its stated desire for improved relations with the Arab countries and for dialogue and détente into concrete steps, both in word and in deed, in the form of a genuine response to the earnest appeals launched by the United Arab Emirates as well as the States members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab States, international groups, friendly nations and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, calling for a solution to the dispute over the three occupied islands by peaceful means in accordance with customary practice and the covenants and rules of international law, either through direct, earnest negotiations or through recourse to the International Court of Justice, so as to build trust and enhance security and stability in the Arabian Gulf region;

8. To have all Arab States undertake, in their contacts with Iran, to raise the issue of Iran's occupation of the three islands in order to stress the need to end it, based on the fact that the three islands are occupied Arab territory;

9. To inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President of the Security Council of the importance of maintaining the issue on the list of matters of which the Security Council is seized until Iran ends its occupation of the three Arab islands and the United Arab Emirates regains its full sovereignty over them;

10. To request the Secretary-General to follow up this matter and report to the Council at its next session.

(Decision 6554 — 124th ordinary session — meeting 2 — 8 September 2005)

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Security Council

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21 September 2005

Original: English

Letter dated 16 September 2005 from the Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

In my capacity as the representative of the current chairman of the African Union, I have the honour to transmit herewith the communiqué issued by the thirty-eighth meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, held on 14 September 2005, in New York, concerning the situation in Côte d'Ivoire.

I should be grateful if the text of this letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Aminu Bashir **Wali**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations

05-51954 (E) 230905

Annex to the letter dated 16 September 2005 from the Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Communiqué of the thirty-eighth meeting of the Peace and Security Council

The Peace and Security Council of the African Union held its thirty-eighth meeting in New York on 14 September 2005.

The meeting, which was held at the level of Heads of State and Government, received and considered a report by the African Union mediation team on the latest developments in Côte d'Ivoire.

The Peace and Security Council,

1. *Welcomes* the report of the African Union mediation team;

2. *Commends* President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, the African Union mediator, for his tireless efforts and expresses its appreciation for the progress made so far in addressing the outstanding issues that were impeding the full implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis and Accra Agreements;

3. *Expresses* concern over the fact that the Ivorian parties did not demonstrate the necessary political will for the full implementation of the agreements reached on the outstanding issues, in particular the dismantling and disarmament of the militias, disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation and the creation of conditions for holding free, fair and transparent elections. The Council urges the Ivorian parties to recommit themselves to the peace process, exercise restraint and honour their obligations;

4. *Underlines* the need to review the situation in Côte d'Ivoire before 30 October 2005. In this regard, the Council requests the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) summit to urgently convene to assess the situation with respect to the problems of the implementation of the outstanding agreements and report to a meeting of the Peace and Security Council, to be convened urgently at the summit level, with the participation of ECOWAS leaders, to consider the matter and decide accordingly;

5. *Expresses* its readiness to continue to cooperate with the United Nations on the best ways and means to support and advance the peace process;

6. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the situation in Côte d'Ivoire.

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Security Council

Distr.: General
22 September 2005

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Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions, in particular resolution 1590 of 24 March 2005, and statements of its President concerning the Sudan,

Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of the Sudan,

Reiterating its expression of sympathy and condolences on the death of First Vice-President Dr. John Garang de Mabior on 30 July 2005; *commending* the Government of the Sudan and First Vice-President Salva Kiir Mayardit for continued efforts for consolidation of peace in the Sudan,

Welcoming implementation by the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 9 January 2005, and in particular welcoming the formation of the Government of National Unity as a significant and historic step towards lasting peace in the Sudan,

Urging the parties to meet their outstanding commitments to the CPA, including, as a priority, the establishment of the Assessment and Evaluation Commission,

Determining that the situation in the Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acknowledging the commitments by troop-contributing countries in support of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) and *encouraging* deployment in order for UNMIS to support timely implementation of the CPA,

1. *Decides* to extend the mandate of UNMIS until 24 March 2006, with the intention to renew it for further periods;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council every three months on the implementation of the mandate of UNMIS, including its work to reinforce the efforts of the African Union Mission in the Sudan to foster peace in Darfur;

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3. *Urges* troop-contributing countries carefully to review the Secretar
General's letter of 24 March 2005 (A/59/710) and to take appropriate action
prevent sexual exploitation and abuse by their personnel in UNMIS, including pr
deployment awareness training, and to take disciplinary action and other action
ensure full accountability in cases of such misconduct involving their personnel;

4. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

United Nations S/2005/600

Security Council

Distr.: General
22 September 2005

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the deputy representative of the Russian Federation on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a note verbale dated 19 September 2005 from the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, stating that Ilya I. Rogachev has been appointed deputy representative of the Russian Federation on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, that communication constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

05-52025 (E) 220905

United Nations A/60/375-S/2005/601

General Assembly
Security Council

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22 September 2005

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General Assembly
Sixtieth session
Agenda item 19
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Sixtieth year

Letter dated 22 September 2005 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 15 September 2005 addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Reşat Çağlar, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda item 19, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Baki **İlkin**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

05-52042 (E) 260905

Annex to the letter dated 22 September 2005 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 19 August 2005, addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot Representative and circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council on 23 August 2005 (A/59/899-S/2005/537) which contains distortions and misinformation regarding the intentions of the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

Citing the misquoted extracts from the text of an interview given by President Mehmet Ali Talat to the Turkish Weekly, the New Anatolian, published on 8 August 2005, the Greek Cypriot representative makes a baseless claim that President Talat's main preoccupation is the recognition of the TRNC rather than a negotiated settlement on the island.

The fact of the matter is that such words have not been uttered by the Turkish Cypriot leader during that interview. It was obviously a case of a misquotation, and the newspaper in question has issued a correction on 13 September 2005 stating "..... *due to an error in translation, Mr. Talat was incorrectly quoted in our newspaper as saying 'the meaning of our proposal is to achieve the last phase before full recognition in exchange of Maraş (Varosha)'. That expression did not take place in the original records of the interview which was conducted in Turkish. We hereby state that the aforementioned expression in quotes goes beyond what was in fact said. The New Anatolian acknowledges our mistake and does not want this quotation to be ascribed to TRNC President Mr. Talat*". However, in furtherance of its campaign of misinformation, the Greek Cypriot side has wasted no time in hastily responding without confirming the news from its source.

The futility of this claim becomes evident when considered against the mountain of evidence to the contrary. President Talat's unequivocal support for the Annan Plan in the run up to the referenda is in line with his decades-old vision for settlement in the island. In fact, Your Excellency has attested to this reality in your mission of good offices report of 28 May 2004, as follows: ".... *I wish to record, however, my appreciation of the efforts of Mr. Talat both in the process and in the run-up to the referendum*".

The Greek Cypriot representative exploits this aforementioned misquotation to portray our efforts to end the inhuman isolation of the Turkish Cypriot people as a temporary objective on the road toward full recognition. In line with the letter and spirit of your mission of good offices report (S/2004/437) dated 28 May 2004, as well the declaration of the EU Council of Ministers dated 26 April 2004, we have always stated that ending the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot people is not an end in itself nor a substitute to a negotiated settlement in the island, but a necessary step that would facilitate the reunification of Cyprus through bridging the economic gap between the two sides. It will also be instrumental in showing to the Greek Cypriot side that its policy of total strangulation of the Turkish Cypriot people is bound to fail and thus it should return to the negotiating table with the right frame of mind for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem.

The Greek Cypriot recount of the talks between the two sides in Brussels in June 2005 on the two draft regulations of the EU Commission on Northern Cyprus, namely the financial aid and direct trade regulations, is also misleading. As you are well aware, the Greek Cypriot leadership continues to block the adoption by the EU Council of these two regulations. The uncompromising position assumed by the Greek Cypriot leadership in the deliberations of EU has so far rendered EU efforts unsuccessful. Still, it was important as it revealed, once again, that under no circumstances the Greek Cypriot leadership will consent to the lifting of the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot people as it constitutes one of the cornerstones of its policies in Cyprus.

Our offer to return Maraş (Varosha) for resettlement was a sincere effort to keep up the spirit of give and take, taking into account continuous calls of the Greek Cypriot side for such a move. However, sticking to its maximalist position, the Greek Cypriot leadership rejected it off hand, showing again that as far as the Greek Cypriot leadership is concerned words and deeds invariably differ.

The attempt made in the letter to justify the continuation of the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot people by invoking the UN Security Council resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984) is irrelevant. The interpretation of these resolutions as such, particularly in the light of the expressed will of the Turkish Cypriot people for the unification of island in the 24 April 2004 referendum, is to say the least, peculiar. In this context , I would like to refer to your mission of good offices report (S/2004/437) dated 28 May 2004, in which you stated and I quote: "*I would hope they (members of the Security Council) can give a strong lead to all states to cooperate both bilaterally and in international bodies to eliminate unnecessary restrictions and barriers that have the effect of isolating the Turkish Cypriots and impeding their development deeming such a move as consistent with Security Council resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984)*".

Regarding the Greek Cypriot representative's remarks pertaining to a political settlement in Cyprus, I would like to refer, once again, to the same report, in which you stated and I quote: "*what was rejected (by the Greek Cypriots) was the solution itself rather than a mere blueprint.....if the Greek Cypriots are ready to share power and responsibility with the Turkish Cypriots in a federal structure based on political equality, this needs to be demonstrated, not just by words, but by action*" and "*if they (Greek Cypriots) remain willing to resolve the Cyprus problem through a bicommunal, bizonal federation, this needs to be demonstrated. Lingering Greek Cypriot concerns about security and implementation of the plan need to be articulated with clarity and finality*". Despite this call being reiterated by Your Excellency on various occasions, it has not yet been properly responded by the Greek Cypriot leadership. The failure and the unwillingness of the Greek Cypriot side to do so

clearly demonstrate that it is not, and has never been, interested in a mutually acceptable settlement, despite continuously professing to the contrary.

Turkish Cypriot people are for a new partnership in Cyprus as unequivocally reflected in the results of the referenda held in the island last year. Bizonality, political equality and the continuation of the 1960 system of guarantees are essential ingredients of a viable and lasting settlement. In order to have a realistic chance of achieving this goal, the Turkish Cypriot side must have a negotiating partner who is willing and able to negotiate for a new partnership free of the devious tactics employed hitherto. As a first step, the Greek Cypriot side, without further delay, should heed to Your Excellency's call and pronounce itself with "clarity and finality" on the questions put to it by Your Excellency.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 19, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Reşat **Çağlar**
Representative

United Nations S/2005/602

Security Council

Distr.: General
23 September 2005
English
Original: French

Letter dated 23 September 2005 from the Permanent Representative of Morocco to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you of the following:

Since the proclamation by the United Nations, on 6 September 1991, of the ceasefire in the Sahara, the international community has regularly called upon all the parties to comply with the binding obligations of international humanitarian law and to separate them from the political aspects of this regional dispute.

In this respect, the Kingdom of Morocco has fully met all its obligations, on time, in particular by releasing detainees, including Algerian soldiers, and providing all the clarifications on alleged disappearances requested by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Through the determination of the international community, expressed, in particular, in repeated appeals by the Secretary-General and the Security Council, on 18 August 2005, after many delays and shameful manoeuvring, the arbitrary detention of the last Moroccan prisoners who were still being held at Tindouf was brought to an end, alleviating their sufferings and those of their families.

The chronicle of grave violations of the rights of the Moroccans detained in Algerian territory is continuing, however, including for the numerous people who have succumbed to the inhuman and degrading treatment of their torturers. From the point of view of international law and morality, these blatant war crimes, which have been committed against thousands of Moroccan prisoners, cannot remain unpunished.

These crimes are subject to universal jurisdiction and, since they have not been prosecuted by the Algerian justice system, they may be brought before any other national or international court.

It is a question not only of punishing the guilty, but also of compensating the victims and their families. Moreover, it is essential to bring to light the full truth about the disappearance of hundreds of Moroccans, after their arrest by the same jailers.

As to the thousands of Moroccan civilians who are still in the camps, they are not enjoying any of the fundamental rights of the individual, including freedom of expression and of movement.

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has not been able to conduct a census of this population, an essential element of its

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mandate, because Algeria is still making it conditional on a political process for settlement of the dispute, in flagrant violation of international humanitarian law.

The limited presence of UNHCR in the camps and among the refugees is another obstacle which the country of asylum has placed in the way of the fulfilment by UNHCR of its mandate. Moreover, the existence within the camps of detention centres and military barracks deprives them of any civilian status. The Kingdom of Morocco has constantly denounced all these violations, which cause grave damage to the peoples, who are being held hostage in violation of all the principles governing the right of asylum.

It was under these circumstances that a diversionary and propaganda exercise was undertaken in the Sahara, particularly at Laayoune, through provocations and other violent criminal acts affecting people and property and severely disrupting public order.

The Kingdom of Morocco, as a law-based State, after carrying out substantial reforms, recognized as such by the international institutions, naturally reacted to these provoked events by fully complying with the rules of law and the judicial procedures guaranteeing due process.

Meanwhile, it is true that national and international organizations have stressed the overcrowding in certain of the country's prisons, particularly the prison at Laayoune. The measures recommended by these bodies are being put into effect in order to enable these prisons to fulfil their functions, while respecting the dignity of the prisoners.

As to the photographic montages made in Laayoune prison, exploiting the manipulated images of persons who have been prosecuted or sentenced for various crimes, such as homicide, rape or drug trafficking, they are part of a blatant propaganda campaign and will in no way lessen Morocco's determination to comply with international standards, while respecting individual rights and freedoms.

All these manoeuvres coincide with hard-line official declarations designed to impede the resumption of the process of searching for a political solution, although the Security Council, in resolution 1598 (2005) of 28 April 2005, reiterated its call upon the parties and States of the region to continue to cooperate with the United Nations to end the current impasse and to achieve progress towards a political solution.

Morocco, concerned by these actions, was obliged to draw them to the attention of the Security Council, on the eve of the visit which Mr. van Walsum, Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General, is preparing to make to the region in order to investigate the positions of the various parties on the dispute over the Sahara.

The Kingdom of Morocco, for its part, reiterates its firm and constant willingness to cooperate with the United Nations to reach a final and mutually acceptable political solution to the dispute.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have this letter circulated as a Security Council document.

(*Signed*) Mohamed **Bennouna**
Ambassador, Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2005/603

Security Council

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26 September 2005

Original: English

Nineteenth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1592 (2005) of 30 March 2005, by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) until 1 October 2005, and resolution 1565 (2004) of 1 October 2004, by which the Council requested me to keep it informed regularly of developments in the Mission area. This report covers major developments since my previous report to the Council dated 2 August 2005 (S/2005/506).

II. Political developments

2. During the reporting period, significant progress was made in the voter registration process for the elections, together with some progress in the integration of military units, and training of the Congolese national police. Increased cooperation among the Congolese parties represented in the Transitional Government enhanced policy coordination regarding the main challenges of the transitional process, including elections, military and police reform and the security threat posed by the continued presence of foreign armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. There was also some improvement in overall relations between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and neighbouring States.

3. Among notable events, a number of additional appointments were made to the *petite territoriale* (local administration) by three presidential decrees issued in July and September. However, appointments to mayoral posts in several important cities, including Lubumbashi, Bukavu, Tshikapa and Likasi, have yet to be made due to lack of consensus within the Transitional Government. Further appointments to public enterprises were made in a presidential decree issued on 3 August. Concerns have been raised, however, that many of the nominees have little relevant experience in the management of public enterprises. Meanwhile, appointments from among the parties signatory to the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement to the civilian intelligence and immigration services need to be made so that the Transitional Government's capacity to control the border areas, particularly in Ituri and the Kivus, is strengthened.

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4. Calls for a boycott of the electoral process by the Union pour le progrès et la démocratie sociale (UDPS), which claims that it has not been properly registered as a political party by the Ministry of Interior, continued to cause tensions in Katanga and the Kasais, where UDPS supporters have protested voter registration activities. Efforts to persuade UDPS leaders to join the electoral process have thus far been unsuccessful.

5. The Joint Commissions on Essential Legislation, Security Sector Reform and Elections have continued their work. At the request of the Transitional Government, on 25 August, my Special Representative transmitted to President Kabila, on behalf of the International Committee for Support to the Transition, a concept paper regarding the establishment of a fourth joint commission to address issues of good governance and economic management.

Legislative agenda

6. On 25 July, the Joint Commission on Essential Legislation provided the draft electoral law to the Parliament, which transmitted it to the Transitional Government. The Joint Commission and the International Committee for Support to the Transition have encouraged the Government to expeditiously review, adopt and forward the draft law to the Parliament. The International Committee has also called for an extraordinary parliamentary session to review the draft; however, it appears that the session will not be held until October.

7. The adoption by Parliament of the electoral law would enable the Independent Electoral Commission to establish the electoral calendar and proceed with the organization of the elections. The Parliament also needs to adopt without delay other outstanding essential legislation, including on amnesty, the status of magistrates, financing of political parties and the organization of the judiciary, before the elections are held.

Electoral process

8. Voter registration has been progressively extended to the provinces since it started in Kinshasa on 20 June. As at 17 September, more than 11 million voters had registered, including 2.9 million in Kinshasa, out of an estimated electorate of 20 to 25 million. Voter registration is scheduled to end on 25 September nationwide; however, registration time lines have been extended in several areas, such as Katanga and the Kasais, mainly due to logistical difficulties encountered by the Electoral Commission and the slow rate of voter registration.

9. The international community has provided crucial and massive support for the electoral process, including through addressing the budgetary shortfall. However, as at 6 September, pledges by donors for the electoral budget amounted to $274 million, of which only $165 million had been received. Meanwhile, the Transitional Government has disbursed $13 million of the $40 million it had pledged in direct support to the Electoral Commission in the 2005 and 2006 budgets.

Regional relations

10. On 10 August, Vice-President Azarias Ruberwa met with President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda in Kampala on the issue of armed groups operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as other issues of concern to the two countries. On 23 August, the Government of Uganda, in a much overdue and welcome step, declared personae non gratae six leaders of the Ituri armed groups associated with the Mouvement révolutionaire congolais (MRC) and expelled them from Uganda. In the meantime, the Transitional Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is still considering issuing international arrest warrants for the leaders of the Ituri armed groups.

11. From 24 to 25 August, senior Congolese, Rwandan and Ugandan officials met in Kigali within the framework of the Tripartite Commission facilitated by the United States of America. Representatives of Burundi, the African Union Commission, the European Union Presidency and MONUC attended as observers. Participants expressed serious concern at the failure of the Forces démocratiques de liberation du Rwanda (FDLR) to disarm and repatriate in accordance with the group's declaration issued in Rome on 31 March. Participants agreed that the Transitional Government should maintain contacts with FDLR to ensure the implementation of the declaration and that failure by FDLR to comply by 30 September would have serious consequences, including the imposition of sanctions. Furthermore, participants agreed to step up pressure to disarm militias operating in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and to negotiate bilateral extradition treaties concerning the remnant militia leaders.

12. Meanwhile, further progress was made towards the establishment of an "intelligence fusion cell" in the framework of the Tripartite mechanism. On 16 and 17 August, a United States delegation, accompanied by Rwandan, Ugandan and Congolese military officers, visited Kisangani to assess progress towards its establishment. The United States is taking the lead in the training of the Congolese, Rwandan, Ugandan and MONUC personnel who will comprise the cell. The cell will facilitate the exchange of intelligence among the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Uganda on matters related to the activities of armed groups, for the operational use of Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) commanders in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, and will be a confidence-building measure amongst the three countries.

13. Progress in this and other areas was again reviewed at the ministerial level meeting the Tripartite Commission convened on 16 September in the margins of the sixtieth session of the General Assembly. At the meeting, Burundi became a full participant of what is now to be called the Tripartite plus one Commission. The meeting also discussed ways and means of increasing pressure on the foreign armed groups and steps to be taken in that regard by the participating States, the African Union and the Security Council.

14. The core countries of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, held under United Nations and African Union auspices, have continued discussions on the priority projects and programmes to be adopted at the second summit on the Great Lakes, to be held on 16 and 17 December in Nairobi. Despite some improvement in regional relations and lessening of tensions, there has been no breakthrough in the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Democratic

Republic of the Congo and Rwanda. Furthermore, Uganda has yet to appoint an ambassador to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

III. Implementation of the mandate of the Mission

Security situation

Ituri

15. Throughout the reporting period, the security situation in Ituri remained tense as militia remnants continued to commit human rights violations against the local population in areas where MONUC or FARDC were not present. Voter registration, however, made good progress in the district, with more than 1.2 million voters from an estimated electorate of 1.6 million having registered by 14 September.

16. Joint FARDC and MONUC operations continued to play a very important role in improving the security situation in Ituri. Regular joint area domination and cordon-and-search operations have resulted in the apprehension of some militia elements and the seizure of illegal arms and ammunition, as well as limiting the operational room for manoeuvre of the militia groups. One such operation, undertaken on 28 August in the Boga area, 78 kilometres south of Bunia, to verify reports of continued militia activities, dispersed some militia elements into the surrounding area. Joint MONUC and FARDC operations along the southern shores of Lake Albert seem to have discouraged the illicit cross-border transport of weapons across the lake.

17. Despite the disarmament of 15,600 former combatants in Ituri, the National Commission for Demobilization and Reinsertion continues to face difficulties in discharging its responsibilities, in particular the payment of demobilization allowances to ex-combatants, which has led to increased discontent among them. The allowances need to be urgently and regularly paid. In the meantime, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is implementing a short-term reinsertion programme targeting 5,200 ex-combatants and the communities where they are resettling. More than 120 microprojects worth an estimated $3.5 million have commenced. These short-term, labour-intensive and income-generating activities have been hindered, however, by security conditions in certain parts of the Djugu and Irumu territories of the district, where the remnants of the Ituri militias are still active. The weak capacities of local implementing partners and lack of a banking system also constrain effective implementation. Despite increased UNDP activity, approximately 40 per cent of ex-combatants in the region have not yet received any direct reintegration support. The National Commission is reviewing proposals for medium-term reinsertion programmes, whose implementation should help improve the situation.

18. The declaration made on 23 August by the Government of Uganda, that six MRC leaders are personae non gratae on Ugandan territory, is an encouraging development. However, the remaining potential of MRC to undermine tangible progress in stabilizing Ituri remains of concern, particularly given the Transitional Government's incapacity so far to bring armed group leaders to justice and to prevent their movement into and from Uganda. Moreover, although several of the most influential Ituri armed group commanders remain in the custody of the

Transitional Government, it is important that formal legal action against them start without further delay, especially against those accused of war crimes and gross violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.

19. In order to facilitate efforts to extend State administration, MONUC and the International Committee for Support to the Transition organized a meeting on 21 August at which representatives of the Transitional Government from Ituri agreed to establish a special commission to address land disputes and to organize a follow-up meeting in Bunia with local community leaders.

The Kivus

20. The situation in North and South Kivu remained tense during the reporting period, with local authorities and MONUC continuing to actively follow-up on the FDLR declaration of 31 March regarding the repatriation of the group to Rwanda. Meanwhile, voter registration started in the two provinces on 21 August and has generally proceeded smoothly.

21. In North Kivu on 26 August, tensions escalated near Rutshuru following repeated clashes between Mayi-Mayi elements and ex-Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-Goma (RCD-G) elements who have yet to participate in the *brassage* process. Delays in the integration process and the reluctance of some of the former RCD-G military units to undergo integration into the army have contributed to rising mistrust among different ethnic groups in North Kivu. Meanwhile, the voluntary disarmament and demobilization of a number of Mayi-Mayi elements and the incorporation of some of them, following training, into integrated FARDC forces may have helped reduce tensions in some areas of North Kivu. However, protracted delays in payments of salaries of FARDC personnel are causing discontent and increasing desertions and the risk of mutinies within the force.

22. On 25 August, a statement attributable to General Laurent Nkunda, one of the main perpetrators of the Bukavu crisis in May 2004, was published in Goma, in which he threatened to bring down the Transitional Government. In response, by a special decree issued on 2 September, the Council of Ministers stripped Mr. Nkunda of his rank, removed him from the army and decided to prosecute him. Authorities in North Kivu have since arrested several persons with alleged connections to Mr. Nkunda. Meanwhile, MONUC supported by the FARDC Eighth Military Region is considering ways to bring Nkunda, who remains at large, to justice.

23. Joint or parallel MONUC and FARDC operations, including area domination and cordon-and-search missions, as well as day and night patrols have resulted in an improved security situation in South Kivu. Some 1,000 troops, comprising two FARDC battalions, took part in one such operation from 6 to 9 September in the Kahuzi Beiga Park area, which is an area of FDLR concentration. There are reports that FDLR elements have dispersed in South Kivu and that their ability to move freely in population centres and to attack civilians has been restricted. The capacity of FDLR to carry out attacks should not be underestimated, however, particularly given the limited resources, poor military training and lack of discipline of the FARDC units in the area, and the occasional collaboration with FDLR commanders. Additional steps need to be taken by the Tripartite plus one Commission and the Security Council if FDLR does not meet the 30 September deadline established for its implementation of the 31 March Rome declaration.

Katanga

24. Law and order problems continue to contribute to the fragile security situation in some areas of Katanga where the Transitional Government has not established effective security mechanisms for the protection of civilians. Despite calls by UDPS for a boycott of voter registration, this process has continued in Katanga in a generally peaceful fashion.

25. In northern and central Katanga, most Mayi-Mayi commanders have so far refused to join the *brassage* process and lawlessness continue to prevail in 10 out of Katanga's 21 territories. Tensions remain high especially in north-eastern Katanga, where several clashes have occurred between FARDC units and Mayi-Mayi groups. On 10 and 11 August, FARDC exchanged fire with a Mayi-Mayi group near the Lunga gold mine, about 200 kilometres from Kalemie, and took control of the area. However, it was doubtful that FARDC contingents deployed in the province would be able to establish effective, sustained control over the whole of Katanga and significantly limit the Mayi-Mayi's ability to harass the local population and illegally exploit natural resources. The lack of State authority and tensions between ethnic groups pose a serious potential threat to the security of the electoral process.

26. In southern Katanga, there is concern that ethnic tensions may intensify during the electoral process. In some cities, there has been an increase in the number of armed youth groups whose anti-"non-indigenous" rhetoric and willingness to resort to violence is likely to create an atmosphere of fear during the elections and spark ethnic violence.

27. FARDC continues to be poorly equipped and sustained and MONUC believes that an enhanced military presence would be required to help secure the elections in several key areas of Katanga. At its current level, MONUC does not have the capacity to assist in providing electoral security in northern and central Katanga or to extract electoral and other United Nations personnel from those volatile areas, or from the area around Mbuji-Mayi. I would therefore recommend once again to the Security Council that due consideration be given to authorizing the deployment to MONUC of an additional brigade of 2,580 personnel comprising a headquarters, three battalions and enabling assets including one Level II hospital, one engineer company, one observation helicopter unit and one utility helicopter unit.

28. The brigade would focus its efforts primarily on addressing the Mayi-Mayi threat in the northern Nyunzu-Kabalo-Kongolo-Moba and central Pweto-Mitwaba-Manono axes. One battalion and headquarters enabling assets would be needed to secure the Kalemie airport; provide a secure environment for the electoral process; monitor the arms embargo at the airport and ports on Lake Tanganyika-Moba; deter movement of armed elements from South Kivu to Katanga; monitor the Mayi-Mayi in northern and central Katanga and encourage them to join the *brassage* or disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process; and provide an extraction capability for MONUC and other United Nations personnel located in northern Katanga and the Kasais.

29. A second battalion would deploy to the southern town of Kamina to protect the airfield; provide a secure environment for the electoral process within its area of operations; monitor and encourage the Mayi-Mayi in the south to take part in the *brassage* or disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process; and support and mentor FARDC, specifically in Kamina. A third battalion would deploy two

companies, one to protect United Nations installations at the Lubumbashi airport while maintaining a brigade reserve with the other company and the battalion headquarters in Lubumbashi. The reserve would also support formed police units deployed to the area.

Disarmament and repatriation of foreign armed groups

30. Following the 16 July communiqué by the Transitional Government stating that it would take forcible action to disarm FDLR, consensus has been emerging within the Transitional Government on how to address the problem of foreign armed groups, and particularly FDLR. A meeting was held in Bukavu on 5 August between representatives of the Transitional Government, FDLR and MONUC to discuss modalities for encouraging the voluntary return of FDLR combatants to Rwanda, in accordance with the Rome declaration of 31 March.

31. Meanwhile, as described in paragraphs 20 to 23 above, the FARDC-MONUC joint operations in the Kivus continue to limit the ability of FDLR to manoeuvre in the more densely populated areas and to threaten civilians. This new resolve of the Transitional Government to take more robust military action deserves to be actively supported by the international community, particularly by enhancing the military capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

32. The Transitional Government should also be encouraged to take more decisive steps in using its own assets to help consolidate State authority and establish effective security mechanisms in areas where FDLR are no longer present. This aspect is becoming increasingly urgent, as the growing split among some FDLR commanders and preconditions recently posed by the group may further affect the implementation of the Rome declaration. MONUC has continued its efforts to take advantage of any opportunities for the peaceful repatriation of FDLR combatants and their dependants. The Mission is discussing with some Rwandan combatant leaders and with the Transitional Government the technical modalities of repatriation, and has publicized the decision taken by the Government of Rwanda that it would not prosecute any returning combatant aged 14 or younger at the time of the 1994 genocide.

Security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

33. In July, FARDC and security sector reform partners prepared a plan for the second and third phases of army integration. This plan should result in the formation of 12 additional integrated brigades, six in each phase, prior to the holding of the elections, which would bring the overall number of integrated brigades to 18. Nine of these brigades would be deployed to the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, three in Ituri, three in North Kivu and three in South Kivu, while another nine would be deployed elsewhere in the country. Meanwhile, the sixth and last brigade from the first phase of army integration is expected to be ready for deployment in late September.

34. During the reporting period, the fourth integrated brigade was deployed to Ituri and the fifth to North Kivu. Unfortunately, a cholera outbreak among soldiers of the

fourth brigade, irregular payments of salaries and lack of food and other support for these troops have raised concerns regarding the lack of oversight and control of the integration of these brigades by the Transitional Government and the international partners on security sector reform.

35. A nationwide census of the army being carried out by a South African team is expected to be completed by December. Preliminary results indicate that less than half of the 350,000 combatants initially declared by the Transitional Government could be identified. Meanwhile, the European Union, in cooperation with MONUC and FARDC, is working on an administrative reform plan for FARDC, including a salary structure and an assessment of training necessary for the various ranks.

36. FARDC and MONUC are also working closely on designing a strategy for supporting and sustaining the nine integrated brigades to be deployed to the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo to conduct joint operations with MONUC. They would be stationed close to MONUC units to facilitate their training for joint operations. A short-term focus would be on border and natural resources control in Ituri, restriction of movement of elements of the Allied Democratic Forces/National Army for the Liberation of Uganda in North Kivu, control of the areas vacated by FDLR after MONUC-FARDC joint operations, and assistance to the national police in provision of security for the population in South Kivu. The medium-term focus would be on control of the mining areas and eliminating the threat of the Ituri armed groups and restriction of the FDLR presence in selected areas in view of the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and rehabilitation process.

37. The implementation of this plan requires that the integrated brigades be adequately equipped and sustained. Such sustained support would include food, medicine and fuel, clothing and individual equipment, communications equipment, vehicles and marine assets. It is proposed that the Transitional Government focus on providing weapons and ammunition, optical equipment, accommodation and medical equipment. Due to the lack of infrastructure in the country, a mechanism might need to be established to facilitate the administration and distribution of this support. The continuing efforts of the European Union, South Africa, Belgium and Angola to contribute towards the reform of the armed forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are vital and most welcome. However, increased, sustained support by donors for the critically important task of strengthening the capability of FARDC and ensuring its effective, long-term functioning is critical for ensuring security and durable stability in the country. Progress by FARDC in assuming effective responsibility for security nationwide would also constitute a key benchmark guiding the exit strategy for MONUC.

38. Meanwhile, the National Commission for Demobilization and Reinsertion has opened additional orientation centres for combatants, including in the vicinity of the six currently operational army integration sites, to lower the costs of transporting ex-combatants who have opted to integrate into the army. Although the World Bank is addressing the issue of transporting combatants from their original locations to the army integration centres, the transportation of integrated units from the centres to their deployment areas is continuing to delay the process.

Police reform

39. During the reporting period, the MONUC police component made further progress in fulfilling its mandate to assist the national police force with its preparations to secure the electoral process. Meanwhile, following an assessment of the security challenges posed by current voter registration activities, the Transitional Government increased from 32,000 to 39,000 the number of trained police personnel required to secure the electoral process, including 18,500 officers and crowd-control and other specialized units. As at 16 September, MONUC-trained instructors from the national police had provided refresher courses for over 14,900 of the required police officers. The training of some 4,700 of them was funded by the International Cooperation Agency of the Government of Japan.

40. MONUC police officers are now co-located with the Inspector General of Police and 10 of the 11 provincial inspectors, to whom they provide technical advice on various aspects of policing. MONUC has also completed the training of some 674 crowd-control personnel in Bukavu, Matadi and Mbuji-Mayi and will be conducting similar training programmes in Mbandaka, Mbuji-Mayi, Kindu and Kinshasa in the coming weeks. The Mission's efforts are being complemented by bilateral support from Angola, France, the United Kingdom, South Africa and the European Union, whose experts are undertaking separate training programmes for crowd-control and counter-terrorism units.

41. Meanwhile, national police officers trained in electoral policing are being used in areas where voter registration is taking place, including for the transport and securing of electoral materials, protection of Independent Electoral Commission officials and voter registration sites and the maintenance of law and order. Some of these activities have, however, been disrupted by delays in the payment of daily allowances which the Transitional Government pledged to provide to the police personnel providing electoral security. The verification of national police personnel, which is under way in Kinshasa, should lead to the establishment of the payrolls needed to facilitate the regular payment of salaries.

42. Meanwhile, only limited progress has been made by donors in providing the resources pledged in support of security for the electoral process to the UNDP-managed basket fund. As of 6 September, only $7.6 million had been received out of $48.4 million pledged by donors. UNDP has continued to use the available funding to purchase non-lethal and communications equipment for the national police. Meanwhile, the Transitional Government has disbursed $1.6 million of the $4 million it has pledged.

Humanitarian situation

43. On the humanitarian front, the special action plan for the Democratic Republic of the Congo is being developed, with a preliminary budget of $800 million. The major objectives of the plan are to save lives, reduce vulnerability and facilitate the transition, with reintegration as a cross-cutting issue. The national plan is based on provincial action plans developed by humanitarian and development personnel throughout the country with the support of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and United Nations agencies. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is also a pilot country for the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative, and in

accordance with the principles of the initiative, donors are encouraged to channel funds for humanitarian assistance and transitional activities exclusively through the humanitarian action plan. It is of great concern that as at 6 September, only $92 million, or 48 per cent of the $193 million requested through the 2005 Consolidated Appeal, had been provided, while the country is facing a dire humanitarian situation.

44. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is assisting some 388,000 Congolese refugees located in all nine countries bordering the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Of these, 152,000 are in the United Republic of Tanzania, 40,000 in Rwanda and 30,000 in Burundi. The voter registration process, as well as reduced food rations in refugee camps in the United Republic of Tanzania and the end of the school year have contributed to a recent increase in refugee returns. Continuing insecurity in the Kivus, however, has led UNHCR to caution against premature returns. In August, UNHCR met with representatives of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Republic of Tanzania to discuss the matter; the two Governments intend to begin supporting voluntary returns in September. MONUC is supporting the preparation of areas of return and is providing logistical support to UNHCR.

45. The humanitarian community is also supporting the return of internally displaced persons in Ituri. During August, non-governmental organizations assisted the return of more than 3,000 families to areas in the Djugu territory and in July and August of more than 1,000 families to Ituri from the Beni-Erengeti axis. A further 2,000 are expected to return over the next few months.

46. MONUC is also addressing widespread malnutrition in Congolese prisons, although the humanitarian community is reluctant to undertake institutional feeding. MONUC has organized or supported initiatives in this regard in Mbuji-Mayi, Lubumbashi, Kisangani and Bunia. MONUC quick impact project funds are being used to rehabilitate prisons where conditions are particularly poor, including in Lubumbashi, Kindu, Kinshasa and Kisangani.

Human rights

47. During the reporting period, MONUC investigated a number of attacks by armed groups on villages in South Kivu. In late July, a multidisciplinary team found that at least 50 civilians, mostly women and children, had been killed and some 3,000 displaced in an attack on 9 July by an armed group on the village of Kabingu in Bunyakiri territory. In North Kivu, MONUC teams continue to monitor the volatile security situation in the Rutshuru and Masisi territories. Frequent clashes between FARDC troops and armed groups operating in the area have resulted in numerous civilian casualties. In Katanga, Mayi-Mayi groups remain a key source of instability in the province, and MONUC has investigated several cases of killing, rapes and abductions of civilians that they have perpetrated.

48. The high prevalence of sexual violence against women and girls remains a major concern in several provinces. FARDC soldiers and police personnel are the main perpetrators of these acts. MONUC has been working closely with its local partners to raise awareness of the issue of sexual violence and is continuing to impress upon judicial authorities the need to arrest and prosecute perpetrators. The

Mission is using quick impact project funds to support non-governmental organizations that are assisting victims.

49. Many challenges remain in combating impunity, particularly in view of the limited capacity of civilian and military judicial authorities to carry out independent and thorough investigations and to provide protection to victims and witnesses. After the murder of a human rights activist in Bukavu in July, a military commander intervened in the investigation and ordered the release of the suspects, which highlighted the lack of judicial independence.

Child protection

50. During the reporting period, discussions were held between national authorities and MONUC and other child protection partners on the establishment of specialized police units to address child protection issues, alternatives to imprisonment for juvenile suspects and the reform of the 1950 juvenile delinquency law.

51. As a result of the *brassage* process, MONUC and child protection partners have monitored an increase in children leaving the armed groups. Between January and the end of August, more than 2,000 children passed through transit centres in North Kivu, including Beni, and some 800 through centres in South Kivu. The development of sustainable reintegration programmes including education, skills training and community-based projects for children released from armed groups remains a major challenge, particularly given the limited capacity to meet outstanding needs. In some areas, there is credible evidence of harassment and threats of re-recruitment of children released from armed groups, and lack of security continues to hamper reintegration.

52. Alleged rapes of minors, including very young girls, continue to be a very worrisome issue. MONUC has participated regularly in regional commissions on sexual violence as a means of strengthening support for child victims of rape. While a few cases of rape of minors have reached the courts, most are either not followed up or are settled out of court, as was the case of a 17-year-old allegedly raped by a FARDC soldier in mid-August in South Kivu and other cases reported in northern Katanga.

Rule of law

53. During the reporting period, MONUC supported the Office of the Auditor General in Kinshasa in developing a training package for military and civilian magistrates on ethics in the administration of justice. A mobile pilot programme is to begin in September in Kisangani. MONUC is also supporting the development of a similar programme led by the Ministry of the Interior, targeting the role of civil authorities in the administration of justice.

Public information

54. During the reporting period, Radio Okapi launched additional programming on its short wave frequency devoted to voter education regarding the electoral process.

On 12 September, the station began a new schedule of elections-related broadcasts, including interviews with representatives of political parties, civic education topics and programmes highlighting candidates' platforms.

55. In partnership with UNDP and Projet d'appui au processus électoral en Republique democratique du Congo, MONUC has produced several video clips on the electoral process in the five national languages. They are being widely broadcast locally by 30 national television stations.

Integrated mission concept

56. Steps are being taken to strengthen the role of the United Nations country team, including the recruitment of a new Chief of the Resident Coordinator's Office and the identification of additional staff. The existing coordination structure, which includes more than 15 joint sectoral groups comprising representatives from the Government, donors, United Nations agencies, MONUC and non-governmental organizations and which is supported by the country team, is being reviewed to ensure the most effective use of donor resources. The country team is also developing regional transition plans for each province to build confidence in the peace process by outlining the immediate actions envisaged by the international community at the regional level following the holding of elections. The plans will focus on programmes to improve economic conditions in vulnerable communities.

57. UNDP, together with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, supported a nine-day training course for 15 new chiefs of diplomatic missions, focusing on diplomatic protocol, international relations, international security and development cooperation. Furthermore, UNDP, together with the Transitional Government organized a seminar on transparency, ethics and good governance for the 550 new appointees to public enterprises. The topics include public sector management, legal principles, anti-corruption regulations and institutional relations between the enterprises and relevant ministries.

IV. Disciplinary matters

58. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 59/287, MONUC is preparing the transfer by 30 September of all remaining investigations and allegations relating to sexual exploitation and abuse and its investigative capacity from its Office for Addressing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse to the Office of Internal Oversight Services. The two offices are working closely together to ensure a smooth transfer. By December, the Office for Addressing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse will be replaced by the Conduct and Discipline Unit dealing with sexual exploitation and abuse and other forms of misconduct.

59. From 25 December 2004 to 1 September 2005, the Office for Addressing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse concluded and submitted to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations more than 100 investigations. As a result of the investigations, 10 staff members were charged, 6 of whom have been suspended without pay and 2 suspended with pay pending final disciplinary decisions. Three United Nations volunteers were summarily dismissed and two reprimanded. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations has authorized the repatriation of 25

military personnel on disciplinary grounds, including contingent commanders. A 120-person formed police unit was also withdrawn by the contributing country in September owing to charges of sexual exploitation against several of its members.

60. Under the overall guidance of the Mission's headquarters, the heads of the regional offices of MONUC are responsible for developing and implementing regional action plans for the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse in their respective areas. Accordingly, each head of office has been requested to regularly complete a regional action plan checklist and provide it to the Office for Addressing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse. MONUC has also developed a training programme on sexual exploitation and abuse which is being expanded to include all personnel in line with the Department's global training policy. Similarly, the Force Commander and Police Commissioner have been tasked to develop and implement similar regional actions plans. Brigade, sector and contingent commanders have been requested to regularly complete a regional action plan checklist and provide it to the Office for Addressing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.

61. The inter-agency focal point network on sexual exploitation and abuse, chaired by MONUC, is following a joint approach to combating sexual exploitation and abuse. Common standards and procedures are being developed in six key areas: the code of conduct; training materials and strategies; standardization of procedures for the referral of complaints within an agency; community outreach; standardization of procedures for implementing partners of United Nations agencies and MONUC in compliance with the Secretary-General's bulletin (ST/SGB/2003/13) on special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse; and the transmission of complaints received by one agency about an incident involving a staff member of another agency. Furthermore, a training programme for the Heads of Agencies and focal points is also planned.

62. MONUC recently established a Sexual Violence Working Group, chaired by the Office for Addressing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, which is developing a range of training and advocacy packages for the Congolese military, police and judiciary, as well as a review of relevant existing legislation. The group is also consolidating all activities and information on sexual violence by MONUC sections and coordinates with the national and regional inter-agency forums.

63. As part of the Mission's approach to assisting victims of sexual exploitation and abuse, the first of several quick action projects in this area has been implemented. A system is to be created under which victims of sexual exploitation and abuse would be referred on a case-by-case basis to a non-governmental organization that would provide necessary support. MONUC has also established a database to facilitate the provision of assistance for individual victims.

V. Administrative aspects

64. Since late June, assistance to the electoral process, and in particular the logistical support for the distribution and retrieval of the materials and personnel associated with the voter registration process, has been the primary focus of MONUC. Supporting the compressed time lines for voter registration has added to the Mission's already formidable logistical challenges associated with the difficult terrain and size of the country and its very limited infrastructure. Although MONUC has diverted a considerable part of its logistics effort to support voter registration, the Mission's

inadequate transportation resources, compared to the magnitude of the electoral task, have contributed to delays in the timely establishment of the registration centres.

65. Staff shortages continue to constrain the Mission's capacity to support the multiple demands of the electoral process and robust military operations in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, in addition to carrying out its other mandated activities. As noted in my previous report (S/2005/506), MONUC has a very high rate of attrition and difficulties in recruiting qualified staff. Cooperation between the military and administrative components, including the assignment of military personnel to augment their civilian colleagues, has helped; however, the logistical components are currently stretched to their limit. MONUC is reviewing means of accelerating the recruitment of international staff for essential management and technical roles, and in the forthcoming 2006/07 budget period will seek approval for a further increase in national staff positions in the Mission.

66. Cooperation between MONUC and the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) and the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) has continued to increase, including in the areas of air transport, troop deployments and rotation and storage of vehicles and equipment. The three Missions are also looking at further expanding cooperation in chartering high-capacity passenger aircraft for troop rotations; establishing a jointly staffed regional procurement office; and enhancing the MONUC facility at Entebbe, Uganda, which already services MONUC, ONUB and UNMIS, to provide troop transit accommodation and a primary point of entry for consignments for all three Missions, among other functions.

VI. Financial aspects

67. As I indicated in my previous report to the Security Council (S/2005/506, para. 80), the General Assembly, by its resolution 59/285 B, authorized me to enter into commitments in an amount not exceeding $383,187,800 for the maintenance of MONUC for the period from 1 July to 31 October 2005. My proposed budget for MONUC for the full 12-month period from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006, including requirements for the support of elections and the additional civilian police personnel authorized by the Council in its resolution 1621 (2005) is currently under preparation and will be submitted to the General Assembly for review and action shortly.

68. I shall inform the Council of the financial implications arising from the proposed deployment to the Democratic Republic of the Congo of the Katanga brigade in an addendum to the present report.

69. As at 31 August, unpaid assessed contributions to the MONUC special account amounted to $358.1 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to $2,187.3 million.

70. Since its establishment in October 1999, the trust fund to support the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has received voluntary contributions amounting to $1.4 million, with expenditure to date of $1 million. With the appointment of the Ituri district administration by the Transitional Government, the trust fund to support the Ituri Pacification Commission established in July 2003 accomplished its purpose. Following consultations with the donors, I have authorized the use of the remaining balance of contributions to the trust fund in the amount of some $67,700 to support the Ituri district administration.

VII. Observations and recommendations

71. Despite delays, largely caused by logistical problems, encouraging progress has been made so far in the voter registration process, which is an important step towards the holding of democratic elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is vital that the necessary legislation, including the electoral law, be adopted by the Transitional Government and Parliament with a minimum of delay so that the elections can be organized no later than June 2006. In this connection, the commendable support provided by the international partners to the electoral process needs to be sustained. I urge donors to accelerate the disbursement of their generous pledges for financing the organization of the elections. Meanwhile, MONUC is expanding its extensive role nationwide in providing logistical and other support to the Independent Electoral Commission, which will be crucial for the successful holding of the polls.

72. In the meantime, considerable progress has been made in training of the Congolese National police who will provide security for the elections. Furthermore, I am grateful to the Security Council for the authorization for additional formed police units, which will be deployed in the coming weeks and will increase the Mission's capacity to assist in providing security during the electoral period. However, as also indicated in my previous report on MONUC (S/2005/506), an enhancement of the Mission's military capacity will be required to address the threats posed by armed groups in Katanga and contribute to establishing the necessary security conditions for elections in that volatile province. In this regard, I hope that the Council will give due consideration to my recommendation for an increase of 2,580 in the force strength of MONUC, to carry out the tasks outlined in paragraphs 27 to 29 above.

73. Good governance, including, in particular, the proper management of natural resources and State funds, including those provided for the elections, and ensuring the regular payment of salaries to military personnel, police and civil servants, is vital to ensure that the transitional process is credible and enjoys widespread public support. In this connection, the Transitional Government needs to demonstrate a commitment to working closely with its international partners to establish a mechanism to ensure the sound, transparent and accountable management of public finances and to effectively address corruption.

74. While well-trained and equipped police and military presences are vital to achieving security, law and order cannot be achieved without effective judicial and corrections institutions to underpin law enforcement activity. In many areas of the country, however, there is neither detention capacity nor any functioning courts, obliging law enforcement authorities to release allegedly dangerous perpetrators or request that MONUC contingents confine suspects for reasons of security and protection of civilians. The Transitional Government needs to take urgent action to increase judicial capacity and to ensure humane conditions of detention. In this regard, I call upon the Congolese authorities to allocate adequate financial resources for strengthening the justice sector in the 2006 State budget and I appeal to donors to increase their support to this vital area.

75. In the remaining months of the transition, the extension of State administration throughout the country and the improved delivery of basic services to the population should be accorded priority by the Transitional Government. In this connection, the

Government and its international partners should focus on developing and implementing a plan to integrate Ituri more fully into the rest of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly with regard to financial, administrative and security aspects. The transitional authorities should also take the necessary measures to establish control over the exploitation of Ituri's natural resources, to promote reconstruction and development and to provide a tangible peace dividend for the people. In this regard, the development of security mechanisms to protect civilians and to facilitate the monitoring of cross-border movements of combatants in the east of the country and violations of the arms embargo should be priority tasks.

76. Despite the immense suffering of the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, too little attention has been paid by the international community to the continuing humanitarian catastrophe in the country. The work being undertaken to launch a 2006 humanitarian action plan seeking to address basic needs of the Congolese people is highly commendable, and I would urge donors to support this important, comprehensive initiative, as well as to provide additional resources in response to the 2005 Consolidated Appeal.

77. During the past three years, MONUC has sought to disarm and demobilize foreign armed groups on the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and to facilitate their voluntary return to their countries of origin. Almost 12,000 combatants and their dependants have been repatriated. During that period, MONUC and the International Committee for Support to the Transition have urged the Transitional Government to take measures to forcibly disarm the remaining foreign armed groups and facilitate their repatriation. The general consensus within the Transitional Government on carrying out a process of forcible disarmament is encouraging. However, FARDC still needs to build sufficient capacity to take effective action against FDLR and additional international financial and logistical support will be crucial in achieving this. Meanwhile, clear public commitments from the Governments of Rwanda and Uganda on security guarantees and incentives for returnees who have not been responsible for gross human rights violations will be vital in encouraging progress in the disarmament and repatriation process.

78. Some progress has been made in the reform of the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including the integration and deployment of five brigades, and it is vital that the Transitional Government assume full responsibility in this important area. In this regard, I would call for increased support by international partners for the security sector reform, including through addressing the main requirements for supporting and sustaining the FARDC brigades, as outlined in paragraphs 36 and 37 above.

79. Further concerted efforts need to be made to stop the continued gross human rights violations by armed groups and FARDC against civilians in Ituri, the Kivus, and central and northern Katanga, which are seriously undermining efforts to stabilize these areas and affecting the organization of elections. Under the Mission's mandate for the protection of civilians, MONUC, as well as United Nations humanitarian and human rights personnel, intend to carry out protection activities, particularly where State institutions are insufficient. I therefore commend the ongoing efforts to bring all components of the Mission, together with other partners, under a common framework for the protection of the civilian population. In this regard, deterrent operations by the MONUC military component will complement the monitoring, advocacy, assistance and support activities performed by

humanitarian and human rights actors, and close coordination is essential in optimizing joint efforts.

80. The constitutional referendum is scheduled to be held before the expiration of the first extension of the transition on 31 December. Parliament is likely to have voted, by that time, for the second and final six-month extension of the transition, to allow the Independent Electoral Commission to organize the elections. In this context, I would recommend that the mandate of MONUC be extended for one year, until 1 October 2006, which would include the period up until the elections and the immediate post-transitional period following the installation of the new Government.

81. In conclusion, I would like to thank my Special Representative, William Lacy Swing, and the men and women of MONUC, the United Nations system and international partners for their untiring efforts, often under conditions of personal risk, to bring peace to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Annex

United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: military and civilian police strength

(as at 21 September 2005)

	Military component				
Country	*Military observers*	*Staff officers*	*Troops*	*Total*	*Police officers*
Algeria	8			8	
Argentina					2
Bangladesh	15	10	1 118	1 143	
Belgium		8		8	
Benin	18			18	12
Bolivia	4		218	222	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	5			5	
Burkina Faso	12			12	24
Cameroon	3	1		4	9
Canada		8		8	
Central African Republic					8
Chad					6
China	10	2	218	230	
Côte d'Ivoire					7
Czech Republic	3			3	
Denmark	1	1		2	
Egypt	8	15		23	12
France	1	5	3	9	12
Ghana	21	5	460	486	
Guatemala	4	2	103	109	
Guinea	2			2	43
India	38	12	3 498	3 548	
Indonesia	9	4	175	188	
Jordan	19	6		25	5
Kenya	30	4	5	39	
Madagascar					3
Malawi	28		111	139	
Malaysia	5	12		17	
Mali	26			26	14
Mozambique	1			1	
Mongolia	2			2	
Morocco	1	3	800	804	
Nepal	19	1	1 118	1 138	
Niger	18	1		19	32

	Military component				
Country	*Military observers*	*Staff officers*	*Troops*	*Total*	*Police officers*
Nigeria	27	1		28	123
Pakistan	26	17	3 752	3 795	
Paraguay	17			17	
Peru	5			5	
Poland	3			3	
Portugal					5
Romania	22			22	1
Russian Federation	23			23	4
Senegal	7	12	454	473	19
Serbia and Montenegro			6	6	
South Africa	3	15	1 390	1 408	
Spain	2			2	
Sri Lanka	2			2	
Sweden	5			5	7
Switzerland		2		2	
Tunisia	23	3	465	491	
Turkey					20
Ukraine	23	3		26	
United Kingdom		7		7	
Uruguay	27	20	1 523	1 570	
Zambia	18	4		22	
Total	**544**	**184**	**15 417**	**16 145**	**368**



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Sixth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1603 (2005) of 3 June 2005, by which the Council requested to be regularly informed of the development of the situation in Côte d'Ivoire and the implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and of the Linas-Marcoussis and Pretoria Agreements. The report covers major developments in the peace process since my report to the Security Council of 17 June 2005 (S/2005/398). During that period, the Council received the fortnightly reports prepared by the Monitoring Group established under the Accra III Agreement comprising the representatives in Côte d'Ivoire of the United Nations, the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

II. The peace process

2. Regrettably, since my previous submission to the Council, there has been only limited progress towards implementing the provisions of the Pretoria Agreement on the Peace Process in Côte d'Ivoire (S/2005/270, annex I) of 6 April 2005, and the significant gap between the positions of the parties has widened. In an effort to revitalize the peace process, the African Union Mediator, President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, convened a meeting of the Ivorian parties in Pretoria from 28 to 29 June, which focused on removing the remaining obstacles to the full implementation of the Pretoria Agreement. The meeting, which brought together Laurent Gbagbo, President of Côte d'Ivoire; Seydou Diarra, Prime Minister of Côte d'Ivoire; Henri Konan Bédié, President of the Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire; Alassane Ouattara, President of the Rally of Republicans; and Guillaume Soro, Secretary-General of the Forces nouvelles, resulted in the signing on 29 June of the Declaration on the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement on the Peace Process in Côte d'Ivoire.

3. In the Declaration, in addition to reaffirming the importance of moving speedily towards the holding of elections in October, the parties agreed that the dismantling and disarmament of militias should be completed by 20 August, and that the Troika, comprising UNOCI, the Office of the Ivorian Prime Minister and the African Union Mediation, would determine what additional measures were required

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to expedite the process. Regarding the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, the parties agreed that the chiefs of staff of the Ivorian National Armed Forces (FANCI) and the Forces nouvelles would meet on 7 July to finalize a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration timetable scheduled to begin by the end of July.

4. The parties also called on the National Assembly to adopt the necessary amendments to the laws on the Independent Electoral Commission, the financing of political parties, nationality, identification, the Human Rights Commission, the print media and audio-visual communication by 15 July. Failing to do so would allow the Mediator to be authorized to decide on "exceptional measures", which should be taken by President Gbagbo to ensure the adoption of the amendments.

5. Finally, the signatories of the Declaration agreed that the African Union should impose appropriate sanctions against those parties who failed to implement the Pretoria Agreement and blocked the peace process. They also agreed that, in such cases, the Mediator would recommend that the Security Council impose the targeted measures envisaged in resolution 1572 (2004).

III. Implementation of the Pretoria Agreement and Declaration

Legislative reforms

6. Following the signing of the Declaration, some progress was made towards carrying out the legislative reforms envisaged in the Linas-Marcoussis and Pretoria Agreements. On 10 July, realizing that the National Assembly would not allow passage of the amended laws on time, due to the continued resistance from the majority party, the Ivorian Popular Front, President Mbeki formally requested President Gbagbo to use his exceptional powers under article 48 of the Ivorian Constitution to ensure the adoption of the amended laws within the timeframe stipulated by the Declaration. On 15 July, in response to the request of the Mediator, the President signed a series of decrees promulgating revised versions of the laws on the Independent Electoral Commission, nationality, identification, the Human Rights Commission, and the print media and audio-visual communication.

7. The Forces nouvelles and the members of the Group of Seven (G-7) opposition parties expressed, however, strong reservations on several of the revised texts, claiming that they still did not conform to the letter and spirit of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. In a letter to the Mediator, dated 12 August, the Presidents of the Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire and the Rally of Republicans outlined their objections to the laws in question. In particular, they pointed out that the amended law on the Independent Electoral Commission did not provide for the representation of the Forces nouvelles in its local organs and failed to establish the primacy of the Independent Electoral Commission over the National Institute of Statistics in the electoral process. They also noted that the new version of the nationality law still deprived certain categories of the population their rights, while the law on identification introduced new criteria, which had not been envisaged in any of the agreements. The Forces nouvelles raised similar objections in a separate letter to the Mediator dated 28 July, in which they also stated that they would not nominate their representatives to the Independent Electoral Commission until their concerns had been met.

8. In the light of those concerns, on 16 August, the Mediator sent a letter to President Gbagbo clarifying his views on various aspects of the contested laws. On 29 August, using again the exceptional powers granted to him under article 48 of the Ivorian Constitution, President Gbagbo promulgated new versions of the law on the Independent Electoral Commission, the nationality code and the naturalization law, bringing them into conformity with the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. However, controversy over the political process continued. On 1 September, in response to a statement by the South African Deputy Foreign Minister, Aziz Pahad, blaming the forces of the opposition for blocking the peace process, the Forces nouvelles declared that they would no longer work with the African Union Mediation, claiming that it was biased towards President Gbagbo, and called on the Chairman of the African Union, President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, to determine how best to move the peace process forward. On 11 September, the Secretary-General of the Forces nouvelles, Guillaume Soro, reiterated his movement's rejection of the African Union Mediation. He also stated that, as of 30 October, President Gbagbo would no longer be President of the Republic but would become an "ordinary citizen" and called on all concerned to work together to put in place a transitional government.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

9. In accordance with the Pretoria Declaration, the chiefs of staff of FANCI and the Forces nouvelles met in Yamoussoukro from 7 to 9 July to discuss the new timetable for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. The meeting resulted in the adoption, on 9 July, of a timetable that envisaged the start of the pre-cantonment of the forces on 31 July, during which the identification of combatants would take place, and the actual disarmament and demobilization of the combatants would be conducted between 26 September and 3 October. It also established a direct link between the implementation of the various phases of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process and the other key provisions of the Pretoria Declaration, including the adoption of revised laws, the establishment of the reconstituted Independent Electoral Commission and the dismantling and disarmament of militias. In addition, it envisaged the establishment of a joint committee for the restructuring of the defence and security forces, which was subsequently launched on 30 July. However, on 31 July, the chief of staff of the Forces nouvelles declared that pre-cantonment would not begin on that day, asserting that several of the laws promulgated by President Gbagbo on 15 July did not fully conform to the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement.

10. Meanwhile, efforts continued towards the rehabilitation of the disarmament sites. According to the Office of the Prime Minister, as of 26 August, five of the nine disarmament sites in the north and five of the six sites in the south had already been rehabilitated.

Dismantling and disarmament of militias

11. The active presence of ethnic and community-based militias continues to be a major source of instability, particularly in the western part of the country, which in recent months has been the scene of violent inter-ethnic clashes. Following the signing of the Pretoria Declaration, some progress was made towards the dismantling and disarmament of militias, although none had been dismantled by the deadline of 20 August, as stipulated in the Pretoria Declaration. On 16 August, three

of the armed militias operating in the west — the Alliance patriotique Wé, the Union des patriotes pour la résistance du Grand Ouest and Le Front pour la libération du Grand Ouest — announced that they would begin the dismantling and disarmament of 2,000 members on 24 August, in Guiglo. On 17 August, an unarmed militia, known as the Force de libération du peuple, was also dismantled in the Abobo area of Abidjan. Ceremonies marking the dismantling of a number of militias operating in the western part of the country were held in the presence of the Ivorian authorities, UNOCI and the African Union Mediation in Toulepleu on 27 and 28 August and in Pehe on 30 August. As of 1 September, 4,800 militias had been registered in this exercise, although no weapons have been collected so far.

12. In spite of this progress, the difficulties encountered in handling the dismantling of the militias demonstrate the need to develop a more assertive political strategy to address the root causes of this phenomenon. In this regard, it is envisaged that 2,000 militia members in the west will be integrated into the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. Others should benefit from alternative reintegration programmes.

Security of the Government of National Reconciliation ministers

13. The UNOCI Sous-Groupement de Sécurité continues to provide security to the ministers of the Government of National Reconciliation and the signatories of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. At the same time, the Mediation has developed a plan for the protection of the Secretary-General of the Forces nouvelles, Guillaume Soro, with a view to facilitating his return to Abidjan. In addition, UNOCI will contribute to an overall plan for the protection of presidential candidates from the opposition, including Mr. Bédié, who returned to Côte d'Ivoire on 11 September, and Mr. Ouattara. In a letter to President Mbeki, dated 19 August, Mr. Bédié and Mr. Ouattara each requested that the South African Government train an additional 20 hand-picked bodyguards, who would form part of an integrated team comprising elements of the UNOCI Sous-Groupement de Sécurité, as well as the 135 Ivorian gendarmerie officers and Forces nouvelles elements who received close protection training from the South African Government. They also underlined the need for the bodyguards to be provided with the necessary arms and equipment to effectively carry out their tasks, noting that the Ivorian Government had, so far, failed to provide a clear indication of how those arrangements would be funded.

14. Meanwhile, following the storming of Ivorian Radio and Television by Young Patriots on 24 July, UNOCI has also agreed to provide security to its Managing Director. It is important to recall, however, that beyond those confidence-building measures, the Ivorian Government remains responsible for the safety and security of its citizens. On 6 September, in Abidjan, the Minister of Territorial Administration, Issa Diakite, was attacked by a group of Young Patriots. During the attack, the reinforcements dispatched by UNOCI in support of the Minister's security escort were deliberately blocked by the Young Patriots and associated elements of the local population and a number of UNOCI vehicles were destroyed. On 7 September, my Special Representative strongly condemned the attack, which constituted a major blow to ongoing efforts to restore confidence between the parties, and called on the Government to launch an immediate investigation into this unwarranted act of aggression.

IV. Restoring security

15. As of 8 September, the overall force strength of UNOCI stood at 6,430, against an authorized strength of 7,090, including 200 military observers. The shortfall is due to the imminent arrival of part of the infantry battalion authorized under resolution 1609 (2005), which is expected to arrive in Côte d'Ivoire by the end of September. The advance party of that battalion and a Special Forces company have already been deployed to Yamoussoukro and Abidjan. In addition, a troop contributor for the aviation unit has now been identified, and the unit is expected to be deployed to Côte d'Ivoire by mid-October.

16. During the reporting period, UNOCI continued to carry out its tasks in accordance with the revised mandate set out in Security Council resolution 1609 (2005). The Mission has re-evaluated its operational commitments in the light of the limited reinforcements authorized under the resolution. Sustained efforts are being made to build confidence among the population and promote goodwill among the warring factions. Robust mobile patrolling of the Zone of Confidence continues with a view to preventing hostilities and enhancing UNOCI visibility, even in remote areas. While adjusting its deployment in anticipation of the arrival of reinforcements and the commencement of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, UNOCI is refining operational plans to assist in the provision of area security during the various phases of the electoral process.

17. The security situation in Côte d'Ivoire remains unpredictable and volatile. Continued violations of the zone of confidence, mainly involving elements of the Forces nouvelles, have contributed to increased tension between the parties. In a positive development, on 10 September, the Forces nouvelles vacated the area of Hopounté, located in the zone of confidence, where they had erected three checkpoints, and withdrew to their original position at Danbaku, which is outside the zone of confidence.

18. Following the attacks, in early June, on the villages of Guetrozon and Petit Duékoué in the west of the country, UNOCI has strengthened its presence in the area and has been conducting joint patrols with FANCI. The appointment of military governors in this volatile part of the country has also contributed to restoring a degree of security, resulting in some internally displaced persons returning to their villages. On 9 September, in Duékoué, UNOCI and Licorne troops, along with elements of FANCI, secured the release of the leader of l'Alliance Patriotique Wé militia group and four of his associates who were being held hostage by a group calling themselves the Young Wé Patriots of Duékoué.

19. Meanwhile, UNOCI efforts to maintain a secure and stable environment have been severely hampered by a dramatic increase in instances of deliberate obstruction of Mission movement and operations in various parts of the country. Between June and July, there was an eightfold increase in the number of cases of UNOCI movements being obstructed by Government forces and associated elements of the local population, particularly Young Patriots. Tensions were further exacerbated by inflammatory statements made by former high level FANCI officers. In particular, on 20 August, the former FANCI chief of staff, General Mathias Doué, called for the departure of President Gbagbo, and threatened to resort to "all necessary means" if the international community failed to ensure his departure. Previously, the former

FANCI spokesperson, Colonel Yao Yao, issued several statements identifying persons alleged to have participated in death squad operations.

20. On 23 July, unidentified assailants carried out attacks on two police stations in the towns of Anyama and Agboville, north of Abidjan, resulting in several casualties among the Ivorian Defence and Security Forces. The Ivorian National Armed Forces regained control of Agboville the following day and arrested 48 persons alleged to have participated in the attacks. On 24 July, following highly inflammatory remarks by some leaders, including the leader of the Young Patriots, Blé Goudé, UNOCI troops were denied access to the town of Agboville, on the outskirts of Abidjan, despite an earlier agreement between the UNOCI Force Commander and the chief of staff of FANCI that UNOCI should assist in containing the situation in that location. On 5 August, a UNOCI fact-finding mission to Agboville was again obstructed by the local population, mainly by Young Patriots, backed by elements of the Defence and Security Forces. Similarly, Licorne forces were denied access to San Pedro on 3 and 4 August, when they tried to deliver vital supplies to the UNOCI Senegalese contingent. On 6 August, the vehicle of my Special Representative was attacked by a group of Young Patriots staging a demonstration in front of the Licorne forces headquarters.

21. On 8 August, my Special Representative for Côte d'Ivoire met with President Gbagbo to express his concern over the recurrent obstruction of UNOCI movement and operations, while the Force Commander of UNOCI sent a letter to the FANCI chief of staff suggesting the establishment of a coordination mechanism between FANCI and UNOCI, including the reactivation of telephone hotlines at central and regional levels. On 10 August, the Office of the President issued a press statement calling on all Ivorians to refrain from obstructing UNOCI movement and operations. However, on the same day, a group of Young Patriots prevented UNOCI staff members from holding a meeting with the local authorities in the western town of Gagnoa. On 11 August, two military observers were prevented from investigating the incident and had to be rescued by UNOCI troops after their vehicle was severely damaged.

22. On 15 August, my Special Representative for Côte d'Ivoire sent a formal letter of protest to the President providing a full list of incidents involving the obstruction of UNOCI movements and reminding President Gbagbo of his obligation under the status-of-forces agreement between UNOCI and the Ivorian Government, relevant international conventions and Security Council resolutions to ensure the freedom of movement of the Mission. On 27 August, President Gbagbo, in a nationwide broadcasted address, called on all Ivorians to allow the impartial forces to move freely throughout the country.

23. Although the security situation in the north has been relatively calm, on 31 August a member of the UNOCI Moroccan contingent was brutally murdered in Bouaké. An investigation into the circumstances of the incident is under way. Furthermore, on 9 September, a UNOCI patrol was fired on by unidentified assailants in the northern town of Tiebila.

Monitoring the arms embargo

24. During the period under review, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1584 (2005), UNOCI has carried out 90 arms embargo inspections in Government and rebel-held areas. Key air and sea ports are being monitored for any

illegal transportation of arms and equipment. Monthly reports and most relevant cases have been referred to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) concerning Côte d'Ivoire for appropriate action. However, most of the inspections carried out by UNOCI have so far proven inconclusive. Meanwhile, an arms embargo expert is being identified to advise UNOCI on how to improve the effectiveness of its arms embargo inspection teams.

25. The Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1584 (2004) has also continued its work and will shortly report its findings to the Security Council.

V. Re-establishing the rule of law, including the police presence and support to the judiciary

Policing

26. As of 8 September, the strength of the police component of UNOCI stood at 464 police officers out of an authorized strength of 725, including 375 officers to be deployed with the three formed police units authorized under Security Council resolution 1609 (2005). The shortfall in the Mission police component continues to be a major cause for concern and affects the ability of the Mission to carry out its mandated tasks. Efforts are being undertaken to identify contributing nations that could deploy French-speaking police officers, who will have a major role to play in the critical months ahead. Meanwhile, the first two formed police units were deployed on 5 and 22 August, respectively. The full deployment of the third formed police unit should be completed by the end of September. The main role of the formed police units, which will be based in Abidjan, Bouaké and Daloa, will be to enhance the protection of United Nations personnel and facilities while assisting in building the capacity of national law enforcement agencies.

27. During the reporting period, the UNOCI police component has focused on training the 600 security auxiliaries recruited from the ranks of the Forces nouvelles who, according to the Pretoria Agreement, will be deployed alongside UNOCI forces in the north and will be responsible for providing security once the cantonment of the Forces nouvelles begins. The training of the 600 auxiliaries began on 1 August, in Bouaké, with UNOCI police officers, Forces nouvelles former police and gendarmerie personnel acting as instructors, as well as civilian personnel from other UNOCI sections. The basic police training will last 45 days. At the same time, during the last three months, UNOCI police also participated in the training of 455 Ivorian police officers and gendarmes, as well as 276 police officers and gendarmes for services at the Abidjan International Airport.

28. The mixed patrols in Abidjan, consisting of FANCI, Ivorian national police and gendarmerie and UNOCI police and military components, were suspended at the end of July due to the claim by the Ivorian security forces that they lacked the human resources needed to continue the patrols. It is hoped that that important confidence-building measure will resume at the earliest.

29. In the meantime, the efforts of the UNOCI police component to advise the Government of National Reconciliation on the restructuring of the Ivorian Defence and Security Forces and assist in the restoration of a civilian policing presence throughout the country have been hampered by the uncooperative attitude of the

local authorities, the absence of a comprehensive reform plan for the Ivorian Defence and Security Forces and the lack of agreement between the Ivorian parties on the deployment of Ivorian police and gendarmerie officers to the north.

The justice system

30. The absence of a functioning justice system in the north and in the zone of confidence continues to be a major cause for concern. In an effort to enhance the ability of UNOCI to address the prevailing culture of impunity in the zone of confidence, UNOCI has developed procedures for the hand-over of persons apprehended by UNOCI or Licorne for serious crimes committed in the zone of confidence to the local authorities. UNOCI is also helping Ivorian judicial institutions to address the lack of courts in the north and in the zone of confidence, and its consequences for the electoral process. Precarious working conditions, lack of clarity regarding the legal status of magistrates and corruption continue to undermine the efficiency, independence and impartiality of the judiciary.

Prisons

31. During the reporting period, UNOCI made frequent visits to prisons in Daloa, Bouaflé, Adzopé, Bondoukou, Abengourou, Aboisso, Bassam, Agboville and Abidjan. The absence of adequate health care and nutrition and the poor state of prison infrastructure continue to be serious causes for concern. Furthermore, minors are not always separated from adults and some prisoners are still subjected to extended periods of pre-trial detention, sometimes lasting as long as 10 years. Meanwhile, UNOCI is gradually expanding its monitoring and advocacy capacity throughout the country and is continuing to make recommendations to the concerned authorities for the improvement of conditions of detention.

Protecting human rights

32. During the period under review, the human rights situation continued to deteriorate throughout the country. Politically motivated and arbitrary detentions, extrajudicial killings, rape, confiscation of private property and the intimidation of opposition leaders and their followers were widely committed with impunity by elements of the Ivorian Defence and Security Forces and by the Forces nouvelles, and militias associated with both forces. Of particular concern were the incidents of ethnically motivated human rights abuses such as killings, rape and the destruction of dwellings, which were also committed by ethnic and community-based militias.

33. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, visited Côte d'Ivoire from 6 to 9 July as part of a tour of West African countries. During her visit, she met with President Gbagbo, Prime Minister Diarra and a number of ministers, as well as opposition leaders in Abidjan and the leadership of the Forces nouvelles. She also collected numerous testimonies about human rights violations committed by elements of the Ivorian Defence and Security Forces and of the Forces nouvelles. The High Commissioner voiced her concern over the continuation of widespread abuses and the prevailing culture of impunity throughout the country, particularly in the zone of confidence, and the erosion of the rule of law within the Government and the Forces nouvelles-controlled areas. A plan of action is being developed to ensure proper follow-up to the issues raised by the High Commissioner.

34. UNOCI continues to closely monitor the human rights situation throughout the country. Its assessment is issued in bimonthly reports, a practice which has contributed to raising awareness of human rights problems.

VI. Redeployment of State authority and restoration of basic services

35. Since my last report, some noticeable steps have been taken towards restoring State authority throughout the country. The national committee for the redeployment of the administration fielded several missions to the areas occupied by the Forces nouvelles. Consequently, Force nouvelles agreed that internally displaced civil servants from the education and health sectors could be redeployed as soon as possible. A census of all displaced civil servants was consequently undertaken in July by the respective ministries. The national committee is also assessing public infrastructure, which requires urgent rehabilitation to ensure that redeployed public servants can return to their areas of responsibility. UNOCI is providing logistics and other support for these efforts to ensure that health and educational services are restored throughout the country before the impending elections.

VII. Elections

36. The obstacles to the holding of free, fair and transparent elections in Côte d'Ivoire remain significant. The controversy over the laws promulgated by President Gbagbo on 15 July has further delayed the establishment of the reconstituted Independent Electoral Commission. As a result, key benchmarks in the electoral process, such as the posting of the provisional register of voters, which according to the Electoral Law must be done at least three months prior to polling day, have been missed. The volatility of the security situation casts further doubt on the feasibility of holding elections within the timeframe stipulated by the Ivorian Constitution.

37. On 19 July, I announced my intention to appoint Antonio Monteiro of Portugal as my High Representative for the elections in Côte d'Ivoire. Following his appointment, the High Representative, whose mandate is to verify, on behalf of the international community, that all stages of the electoral process provide all the necessary guarantees for the holding of open, free, fair and transparent presidential and legislative elections in Côte d'Ivoire, visited the country from 8 to 18 August. During his visit, the High Representative met with a wide range of actors, including the national authorities, the Forces nouvelles, political parties, the diplomatic community and the various members of the United Nations family. He succeeded in obtaining assurances from both the Forces nouvelles and the G-7 that they would nominate their representatives to the Independent Electoral Commission without further delay. In addition, on 16 August, the High Representative, accompanied by my Special Representative for Côte d'Ivoire, met with the African Union Mediator in Pretoria to discuss the remaining obstacles to the establishment of the Independent Electoral Commission, particularly the continuing dispute over the laws adopted by President Gbagbo on 15 July, following which President Gbagbo promulgated a revised version of the laws on 29 August.

38. However, on 25 August, the Forces nouvelles declared that elections could not be held on 30 October since the necessary conditions, including the identification of

all Ivorians nationwide, had not been met, and that a political transition would therefore be required. The communiqué reaffirmed the willingness of the Forces nouvelles to designate their representatives to the Independent Electoral Commission subject to certain conditions, including the participation of the Forces nouvelles in the local organs of the Independent Electoral Commission and the exclusion of the National Institute of Statistics from the electoral process.

39. In addition to the political and security challenges, the funding of the electoral process is also a matter of very serious concern. It will be difficult to finalize the electoral budget until the new Independent Electoral Commission has been established. However, initial estimates already point to a considerable funding gap of around $31 million. The financial support of the international community will be crucial to the success of the electoral process. At the same time, it will also be important for donors to provide their full support to the High Representative.

VIII. Promoting peace and combating media inciting hatred and violence

40. During the period under review, incitements to violence, exclusion and intolerance and calls for a resumption of the armed conflict, continued uninterrupted by the Ivorian media, in particular those associated with the ruling party. Following the Duékoué killings in June and the incidents in Anyama and Agboville in July, the media have engaged in a deliberate campaign to discredit UNOCI, targeting some members of the Mission senior leadership, and accusing the Mission of partiality.

41. A number of attempts to restrict the freedom of the press and access to information also occurred during that period. On 24 July, a group of Young Patriots, backed by personnel from the Ivorian Defence and Security Forces, forcibly interrupted the normal programming of the Radio Television Ivoirienne in Abidjan to broadcast a statement by their leader Charles Blé Goudé. Meanwhile, UNOCI has continued to receive reports on the seizure and destruction of opposition newspapers and the beating of journalists by members of the security forces. In addition, Radio France Internationale FM broadcasts in Côte d'Ivoire have been suspended by the National Commission for Audiovisual Communication since 15 July. UNOCI closely monitors incitements to hatred and violence in the Ivorian media, providing monthly reports to the Security Council, and will further reinforce its media monitoring and analysis capacity in the period leading to the elections.

42. UNOCI has increased its efforts to raise Ivorian public awareness of the mandate and objectives of the Mission in an effort to counteract the effects of the current campaign to discredit UNOCI. At the same time, the Mission radio station, UNOCI FM, has expanded its coverage in the areas under the control of the Forces nouvelles, where frequencies have been made available. In a positive development, the Ivorian Government has provided UNOCI FM with additional frequencies to broadcast in Government-controlled areas.

IX. Humanitarian challenges and economic and social perspectives

Humanitarian situation

43. Limited access to basic social services is having a severe impact on the most vulnerable sections of the population. The situation is of particular concern in the north and west of the country. In addition to acute water shortages in the north, lack of maintenance and over-exploitation of water installations has resulted in the deterioration of the quality of water in certain urban areas, which poses a potential health hazard to the local population. A study commissioned by the International Committee of the Red Cross and funded by the European Union indicates that a considerable percentage of water samples analysed in several towns are not suitable for human consumption and that 7 per cent of those samples are seriously contaminated by life-threatening agents, such as those responsible for typhoid fever and dysentery.

44. In certain areas, poor rainfall is compounding food insecurity by jeopardizing the planting season and triggering a rapid increase in the price of staple foods. The ability to assist the increasing numbers of malnourished children at feeding centres is being hampered by the absence of qualified health-care personnel, most of whom have fled to the south. Despite the efforts of humanitarian agencies and donors, it is estimated that more than 700,000 children, mostly girls, have been denied access to primary education over the past three years due to a lack of teachers and worsening living conditions. However, as of 31 August, only 33.3 per cent of the US$ 36.4 million outlined in the consolidated appeal process for Côte d'Ivoire had been provided.

45. Humanitarian agencies are extremely concerned with the increasing lack of access to affected populations and difficulties in ensuring the protection of civilians. Access is still limited in critical areas due to security constraints or natural obstacles such as the poor conditions of roads and bridges. Given the volatility of the security situation, the return of the 500,000 internally displaced persons, 120,000 of whom are thought to be living in Abidjan with host families, appears unlikely in the near future. During the period under review, United Nations humanitarian agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross and non-governmental organizations have provided about 110,000 internally displaced persons primarily in the west with food, health facilities, shelter, and water and sanitation.

46. Meanwhile, the census of internally displaced persons, which is scheduled to be completed by the end of September, would constitute a useful tool to elaborate future responses and return plans. As of 31 August, more than 29,000 refugees had returned to their home countries, including 11,724 assisted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and an estimated 18,000 had returned spontaneously to Liberia. Some 40,560 refugees remain in the country.

Economic and social situation

47. While the gross domestic product (GDP) of Côte d'Ivoire was estimated to have increased by more than 1 per cent in 2004, economic growth has slowed in 2005 due, in great part, to the negative impact of the crisis of November 2004.

Despite favourable climatic conditions, coffee and cocoa production levels declined by an estimated 45.8 per cent and 31.5 per cent, respectively, in the first half of 2005, due to a number of factors, including a drop in international market prices and the low domestic price offered to local producers. Activity in the industrial sector also decreased by 1.5 per cent, while oil production dropped by 36.8 per cent over the past three years. On the other hand, gas production increased by 10.2 per cent in the first half of 2005. Meanwhile, the rate of inflation increased to 3 per cent, compared to its rate of 1.7 per cent during the same period in 2004. The crisis also continues to have a significant negative impact on the economies of countries in the subregion.

48. Meanwhile, Côte d'Ivoire continues to be in non-accrual status vis-à-vis the World Bank. In that regard, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund undertook a joint mission to Côte d'Ivoire in early September to identify the fiscal and structural reforms required for the resumption of financial aid. The mission indicated that support from the International Monetary Fund, in the form of a post-conflict arrangement, would be conditional upon the Government exercising effective control over most of the national territory, clearance of World Bank arrears to allow the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process to move forward and completion of the disarmament phase of the process.

X. Gender

49. UNOCI continued to conduct gender-awareness training for military personnel, United Nations police and civilian personnel, including through the weekly broadcasting of sensitization messages on various gender-related issues. In that regard, 205 staff members have been trained since last June. UNOCI also contributed to integrating the needs of women into the planning and execution of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes. However, despite repeated requests, the national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme has yet to provide UNOCI with the total number of women involved in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, which remains critical for planning and logistical purposes. Meanwhile, UNOCI is working closely with United Nations agencies and other key stakeholders on the development of a strategy for responding more effectively to the pressing needs of the most vulnerable groups. Following several reports on rape and increased violence against women, UNOCI has prepared a train-the-trainers workshop on gender-based violence. UNOCI has also been liaising with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), civil society organizations, including women's associations, and international non-governmental organizations, with a view to increasing the participation of women in the elections.

XI. HIV/AIDS

50. UNOCI continued to mainstream HIV/AIDS awareness into Mission activities and conducted outreach projects to reduce the risk of peacekeepers contracting or spreading HIV/AIDS. Several risk-reduction activities have been carried out, including the training of peer educators and the provision of voluntary confidential

counselling and testing. Since May 2005, 1,308 personnel have been sensitized and 142 peer educators trained.

51. Meanwhile, UNOCI has established partnerships with more than 10 national and international organizations and agencies for the provision of educational, financial and human resources. The Mission has also partnered with a network of more than 50 local non-governmental organizations with a view to extending its outreach to the host community.

XII. Child protection

52. With the deployment of a child protection adviser to UNOCI in mid-June, a strategy for the mainstreaming of child protection issues into the activities of the Mission is being developed. A protection task force, including key United Nations agencies, has been established to gather information, identify key vulnerabilities and report in a timely manner. Peacekeeping personnel training in child protection began in August.

53. A joint field assessment visit conducted from 11 to 16 July to the west and north of the country by UNOCI, the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme and non-governmental organization partners, confirmed the continuous use of child soldiers by pro-Government militia groups in Guiglo and by the Forces nouvelles in Korhogo. Meanwhile, resources are being mobilized with the support of UNOCI, UNICEF and the World Food Programme to rehabilitate and reintegrate 511 child soldiers, including 204 girls, who have been released and handed over to UNICEF by the leadership of the Forces nouvelles.

54. The reporting period also witnessed the adoption, on 27 July, of a multilateral cooperation agreement to combat child trafficking in West Africa by Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Togo.

XIII. Disciplinary issues

55. During the period under review, my Special Representative continued to actively remind all UNOCI staff of the high standards of personal conduct expected of them, on the basis of my Bulletin on special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse (ST/SGB/2003/13) of 9 October 2003. Curfew rules containing a list of places off limits to United Nations vehicles are reviewed on a continuous basis to cover all locations with a major United Nations presence.

56. The Mission Policy Group on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse is finalizing a UNOCI code of conduct on sexual exploitation and abuse and participates in the country network on sexual exploitation and abuse. During the reporting period, UNOCI trained a total of 177 civilian and 325 military personnel on prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse and developed a training plan for the period for August through December 2005 that includes training and awareness sessions for incoming staff and refresher courses on sexual exploitation and abuse. UNOCI is also in the process of recruiting personnel for its Personnel Conduct Unit.

57. During the reporting period, investigations were launched into three allegations of sexual misconduct received by the Mission. One of the investigations, which is being conducted by the Office of Internal Oversight Services, is still ongoing. The other two, which were both conducted by UNOCI, have been completed. In one case, the allegations received proved to be unfounded, while in the other, the allegations were substantiated. The Mission report on the outcome of that investigation is being reviewed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

XIV. Staff security

58. During the reporting period, the Mission continued to pay particular attention to enhancing staff security. Criminal activities, including banditry, some of which have affected United Nations staff, are on the rise. In addition to deploying troops to monitor sensitive areas, UNOCI has reactivated a security emergency group to monitor potential sources of tension that could affect the life and movement of United Nations personnel in various areas.

59. The move of the Mission into an integrated headquarters complex, currently under refurbishment, is of paramount importance to the overall security of staff in Abidjan and the coordination of responses to potential security threats. Unfortunately, the refurbishment of the building selected for this purpose has been significantly delayed due to the difficulties encountered by the Government in effecting payments to the contractor according to the agreed schedule. Options are currently being explored to facilitate the occupation of the new complex as soon as possible.

XV. Observations

60. Despite the very commendable efforts of the African Union Mediator, President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, actively supported by the United Nations, the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire, and in particular the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement, has made little progress. Moreover, the gap between the positions of President Gbagbo and his ruling party, on one side, and those of the forces of the opposition, on the other, remains wide. As members of the Council are aware, the African Union Mediation considers that the remaining obstacles to the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis, Accra III and Pretoria Agreements have been removed. Although many in the international community have questioned the posture adopted by President Gbagbo in the past, the Mediation feels that he is now committed to finding solutions to the problems facing his country. The Forces nouvelles, however, have not implemented the commitments they have undertaken. The Mediation also advised the Security Council not to impose targeted sanctions on individuals at this stage of the peace process, as that may have a negative impact on its efforts, but rather to consider taking actions against those obstructing the implementation of the agreements they have signed. At the same time, in the view of the Mediation, the lack of trust between the Ivorian leadership continues to affect the manner in which they interact. Ivorian leaders, like many others before them, must seek to overcome the continuing legacy of mistrust and engage in a genuine sustained dialogue.

61. Meanwhile, in a letter to me dated 28 August, Guillaume Soro expressed strong doubts over the impartiality of the Mediation, suggesting that, at this stage in the peace process, a "political transition" would be required, the modalities of which should be discussed within a broader framework than that provided by the Mediation. On 29 August in Abidjan, the political opposition declared that it would be impossible to hold elections on 30 October, while stressing the need for a transitional period during which President Gbagbo would not be in power. Furthermore, in a letter to me dated 8 September, the main leaders of the political opposition, including Mr. Bédié and Mr. Ouattara, expressed surprise over the assessment that President Gbagbo had carried out what was required of him under the Pretoria Agreement.

62. Once again, therefore, Côte d'Ivoire finds itself at a crossroads, with daunting challenges lying ahead. Under the present circumstances, the elections will not be held on 30 October, as required by the Ivorian Constitution. Consequently, urgent attention must be given to the management of the post-30 October period and the preparation of free, fair and transparent elections, the results of which would be acceptable to all. The parties will need to agree on a realistic time frame for meeting key benchmarks in the electoral process. In particular, now that the nationality and identification laws have been brought into conformity with the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, sufficient time will need to be allotted to the voter registration process in order to ensure that it is conducted in a credible manner. Meanwhile, it is vital that the reconstituted Independent Electoral Commission be established without further delay. Urgent steps must also be taken to dismantle and disarm the militia, while continuing preparations for the pre-cantonment of the Forces nouvelles combatants.

63. To that end, the Security Council may wish to consider taking firm action against those who attempt to obstruct the implementation of these and other key provisions of the Pretoria Agreement, notably through the imposition of the targeted sanctions envisaged under Security Council resolution 1572 (2004). The time has come for the Ivorian parties to clearly assume their respective responsibilities. I therefore welcome the decision of the Chairman of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) to visit Côte d'Ivoire in the coming weeks.

64. At an extraordinary meeting held in New York on 14 September, in the margins of the General Assembly, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union entrusted ECOWAS with the responsibility of determining how to overcome the current impasse in the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire. To that end, ECOWAS will convene an emergency meeting before the end of September and report accordingly to the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. On 15 September, I met with the Chairperson of the African Union, President Obasanjo of Nigeria and President Mbeki of South Africa in New York to discuss the way forward in Côte d'Ivoire. We agreed on the need to intensify the efforts of the African Union, ECOWAS and the United Nations in support of the implementation of major agreements reached in Côte d'Ivoire. We also agreed that the parties should re-establish a genuine, much-needed dialogue and proceed, without delay, towards the dismantling of militias, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants and the organization of free, fair and credible elections. To that end, the United Nations intends to continue working closely with the African Union and ECOWAS to assist the people of Côte d'Ivoire in achieving a peaceful and durable settlement of the crisis.

65. In the meantime, I urge all Ivorian parties to exercise the utmost restraint and cooperate fully with the United Nations and other key stakeholders involved in the resolution of the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. The international community will continue, for its part, to monitor closely the words and actions of all Ivorian leaders at this delicate juncture of the peace process.

66. It is also essential that the international partners of Côte d'Ivoire remain fully engaged in the peace process. A significant amount of financial assistance will be required from the international community, in particular for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and electoral processes, as well to support the work of the High Representative for the elections. I therefore urge all potential donors and multilateral institutions to contribute generously to these key areas and to support ongoing efforts to meet the needs of the population, particularly the most vulnerable groups, as well as the process of recovery and long-term development in Côte d'Ivoire.

67. I am deeply concerned that the Government and the Forces nouvelles have shown little determination to bring to justice the perpetrators of human rights abuses, or those responsible for inciting violence and hatred and instigating ethnic tensions. As the High Commissioner for Human Rights stressed during her visit to Côte d'Ivoire in July, in order to address the culture of impunity, individual responsibility for human rights abuses should be asserted. In this regard, I urge the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to urgently complete investigations into the events of Duékoué in May and Anyama and Agboville in July and bring the perpetrators to justice. I also call on the Security Council to consider, as a matter of urgency, the report of the international commission of inquiry on serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in Côte d'Ivoire, covering the period 19 September 2002 to 16 October 2004, which I transmitted to the Council on 23 December 2004.

68. In conclusion, I would like to commend my Special Representative, Pierre Schori, and the civilian and military staff of UNOCI for their untiring efforts in support of the search for sustainable peace in Côte d'Ivoire, as well as the High Representative for the elections, Antonio Monteiro. Similarly, I would like to express my gratitude to the United Nations country team, humanitarian and development organizations and bilateral donors, as well as the countries that are contributing troops and police personnel to the Mission, and to the African Union and ECOWAS for their contribution to the peace process.

Annex

United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire: military and police strength as at 8 September 2005

Country	Military observers	Military component			Police
		Staff officers	Troops	Total	
Argentina					3
Bangladesh	10	8	3 018	3 036	7
Benin	6	3	305	314	16
Bolivia	3			3	0
Brazil	4	3		7	0
Cameroon					50
Canada					10
Central African Republic					3
Chad	3			3	4
China	7			7	0
Congo	5			5	0
Croatia	3			3	0
Djibouti					22
Dominican Republic	4			4	0
Ecuador	2			2	0
El Salvador	3			3	0
France	2	16	171	189	10
Gambia	5	1		6	0
Ghana	6	6	397	409	1
Guatemala	5			5	0
Guinea	4			4	0
India	7			7	0
Ireland	2			2	0
Jordan	7	10	200	217	252
Kenya	5	4		9	0
Lebanon					2
Morocco	1	3	731	735	0
Namibia	3			3	0
Nepal	3			3	0
Niger	6	3	364	373	20
Nigeria	5			5	3
Pakistan	10	11	364	385	0
Paraguay	9	2		11	0

Country	Military observers	Military component			Police
		Staff officers	Troops	Total	
Peru	3			3	0
Philippines	3	1		4	0
Poland	2			2	0
Portugal					1
Romania	5			5	0
Republic of Moldova	4			4	0
Russian Federation	11			11	0
Senegal	8	9	313	330	21
Serbia and Montenegro	3			3	0
Sri Lanka					1
Togo	6	4	292	302	1
Tunisia	2	1		3	0
Turkey					24
Uganda	2	2		4	0
Uruguay	1	1		2	11
Yemen	5			5	0
Zambia	2			2	0
Total	**187**	**88**	**6 155**	**6 430**	**464**



Map No. 4220 Rev. 6 UNITED NATIONS
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Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Cartographic Section

United Nations S/2005/605

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 September 2005
English
Original: French

Letter dated 26 September 2005 from the Permanent Representative of Algeria to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to draw your attention to document S/2005/602 which contains a letter from the Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Morocco directly or tacitly implicating Algeria in some aspects of the Western Sahara conflict.

Caught in the act of repressing Sahrawi civilian populations and accused by non-governmental organizations and the international news media of grave crimes and acts of torture against Sahrawi political prisoners, the Kingdom of Morocco has reacted in the same manner an any occupying or colonial power would by cordoning off the territory which it has been occupying illegally since 1975 and prohibiting non-governmental organizations, the media, outside observers and parliamentarians from entering or expelling them from the territory in question by military force.

Furthermore again, like occupying or colonial powers that are confronted and accused, the Kingdom of Morocco complains of manipulation, asserting that photographs widely disseminated by the international media portraying the heinous treatment of Sahrawi prisoners by notorious torturers are only montages and claiming that the prisoners identified by Amnesty International as political prisoners are merely common drug traffickers.

Lastly, acting as would any occupying or colonial power singled out on the international stage for its policy of oppression and repression, rather than acknowledging the crimes committed against the Sahrawi people for three decades, the Kingdom of Morocco resorts to diatribes against its Algerian neighbour, which is accused of every possible wrong.

Moreover, whereas the Kingdom of Morocco expresses compassion for the plight of its former prisoners of war, every one of whom has now been released, it seeks to detract attention from the fact that for years, on the pretext that the "case was closed", it had chosen to ignore their very existence; it also tries to conceal the fact that their release took so long precisely because of the never-ending vagaries and about-turns of the Kingdom of Morocco concerning, on the one hand, the referendum for self-determination, the holding of which required the prior release of all prisoners in accordance with the terms of the United Nations Settlement Plan for Western Sahara, negotiated and agreed to by the Kingdom of Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO and approved by the Security Council, and, on the other hand, the Peace Plan for Self-determination of the People of Western Sahara unanimously supported by the Security Council, "after the effective date [of which] all political prisoners and prisoners of war shall be released, and the obligation of each party in this regard is not dependent upon performance by the other".

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With respect to the "thousands of Moroccan civilians who are still in the camps", over whom the Kingdom of Morocco is now expressing concern, it should be recalled that they involve Sahrawi refugees, duly identified by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, who have had no other choice but to flee abroad as their homeland was being invaded and occupied by the Kingdom of Morocco and to whom Algeria has generously offered asylum, as it has done for other persecuted persons from Africa, Europe, Asia and Latin America, and who are confidently awaiting the day when they might return home in freedom and dignity.

Meanwhile, among the Sahrawi in question, thousands are settled in territories which have not been occupied by Morocco, and many have been sheltered by Algeria at the explicit request of the international organizations concerned.

In fact, the thinness of Morocco's statement stems from its inability to explain to the international community why it is keeping an entire people under occupation and why, against the unanimous will of that same community, it continues to deny this people the right to self-determination and to reject the various United Nations peace plans after having accepted them. Algeria, for its part, remains calm and certain that it is on the side of right and justice, and is confident that, sooner or later, the people of Western Sahara will exercise their inalienable right to self-determination.

Given the very serious situation prevailing in Western Sahara, where 151 prisoners of war and several hundred Sahrawi civilians are still reported missing, while for strictly humanitarian reasons the Frente POLISARIO itself has released every single Moroccan prisoner of war, and where 37 political prisoners have been holding a hunger strike since 8 August 2005 to obtain political prisoner status, the Security Council must make an urgent appeal to the Kingdom of Morocco, based on the relevant Security Council resolutions, concerning the fate of Sahrawi civilians who have disappeared as well as the unbearable plight of the 37 political prisoners whose lives are now in danger.

Furthermore, through the extension of the appointment of Ambassador Peter van Walsum as the successor to Mr. James Baker as the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara, the Security Council wished to reiterate strongly the need to implement the Peace Plan for Self-determination of the People of Western Sahara and, since this involves bringing about the decolonization of a non-self-governing territory within the meaning of the Charter of the United Nations, to urge the occupying Power to comply with international law concerning the sanctity of the principle of equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination. The Security Council, which clearly pointed the way towards that goal in resolution 1495 (2003), must not allow the Kingdom of Morocco to stall progress indefinitely, paralyse the activities of our Organization and frustrate all the hopes of the international community at a time when it is meeting to celebrate the principles, purposes and ideals of the United Nations.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Abdallah **Baali**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/60/379–S/2005/606

General Assembly
Security Council

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28 September 2005

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General Assembly
Sixtieth session
Agenda item 97 (t)
General and complete disarmament: the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects

Security Council
Sixtieth year

Identical letters dated 23 September 2005 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia concerning the recent developments in the conflict zone in the Tskhinvali region of Georgia, issued in the Tbilisi on 22 September 2005 (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the sixtieth session of the General Assembly, under item 97 (t), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Revaz **Adamia**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the identical letters dated 23 September 2005 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia

22 September 2005

On 20 September 2005, the Tskhinvali separatist authorities held a celebration of the "independence" of the self-proclaimed republic of South Ossetia and conducted a military parade.

The military parade gave a display of military detachments and armoured vehicles, including three self-propelled howitzers (2S1), four tanks (T-55), four armoured personnel carriers (BTR-70), three armoured combat vehicles (BMP-2), three 120mm mortars and three anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23-2).

The above-mentioned represents a gross violation of the basic documents of the peace process — namely, the 1992 Sochi Agreement, the 2004 agreement reached at the meeting between Georgian Prime Minster Zurab Zhvania and South Ossetian de facto leader Eduard Kokoity and the decisions of the Joint Control Commission. This fact was negatively appraised by the OSCE Mission to Georgia as well.

A display of heavy armaments and armoured vehicles that are limited by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe is a major violation of the main provisions and principles of the CFE Treaty, a cornerstone of European security, thus negatively affecting the situation in the region.

Representatives of the separatist regimes of Abkhazia, Transniestria and Nagorno Karabakh participated in the "festive" events. Most regrettably, members of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, mainly from the ruling party, representatives of the central and regional executive authorities, including leaders of the federal agencies, and high-ranking religious leaders also took part in this masquerade and demonstration of force. All these persons violated the State border of Georgia and entered Georgian territory without proper visas.

Taking into consideration the commitment of the Russian Federation to perform the role of principal mediator in the settlement of conflict in the Tskhinvali region of Georgia and to be the guarantor of peace agreements reached, the appearance of the Russian representatives at the side of the Tskhinvali de facto authorities clearly indicates their unveiled support for the separatist regime. Furthermore, despite Georgia's numerous protests, the Russian side continues providing armaments and ammunition to the separatists.

This behaviour is a flagrant violation of universally recognized norms and principles, as well as bilateral multilateral commitments undertaken by the Russian Federation, and infringes the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia.

At the same time, the leadership of Russian peacekeeping forces is merely observing the movements of heavy armoured vehicles in the conflict zone. Instead of opposing these activities, the peacekeeping contingent is busy escorting and providing security for the "guests" hastening to attend the "anniversary

celebrations". Indeed, the arming of separatists, unrestricted movement of illegal armed groups, criminals and smuggled goods, abduction of people on a daily basis and other grave criminal activities in the conflict zone happen with their support. All of the above-mentioned is in blatant violation of the mandate of the peacekeeping forces, calling into question the entire issue of the expediency of their presence in the conflict zone.

In addition, the leadership of the peacekeeping forces makes absolutely irresponsible statements and heaps ungrounded accusations on the Georgian side.

The Government of Georgia has repeatedly stressed that the existence of illicit arms in the conflict zones is a major source of provocations, necessitating an intensification of international control in this regard. As to the recent incidents that took place in the Tskhinvali region, the Georgian side strongly insists on the conduct of an objective investigation, with the participation of OSCE.

Once more, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia strongly demands that the Russian Federation put an immediate end to destructive activities in the Tskhinvali region and refrain from supplying arms to the separatist regimes.

At the same time, we urge the international community to make a due assessment of the Russian Federation's attempt to encroach upon Georgia's sovereign rights, interfere in its international affairs and infringe its territorial integrity.

United Nations A/60/381–S/2005/607

General Assembly
Security Council

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27 September 2005

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixtieth session
Agenda item 19
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Sixtieth year

Letter dated 23 September 2005 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government and further to my letter dated 2 August 2005 addressed to you, I have the honour to draw your attention to new violations of the flight information region (FIR) of Nicosia and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by military aircraft of the Turkish Air Force, recorded on 3, 8, 10, 17, 24 and 31 August and 1, 5, 7, 12, 13, 14, 17 and 19 September 2005, as follows:

On 3 August 2005, one C-130 Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it departed on the same day towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 8 August 2005, two Cougar Turkish military aircraft took off from the illegal airport of Krini, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, before landing at the Kokkina pocket, from where they returned on the same day to the Krini airport.

On 10 August 2005, one C-130 Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it departed on the same day towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 17 August 2005, one C-130 Turkish military aircraft and one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, as follows:

(a) The C-130 Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it later departed towards the FIR of Ankara;

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(b) The Cougar Turkish military aircraft took off from the illegal airport of Krini, violating the international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied areas of Mesaoria, Ammochostos and Morfou, before returning to the same airport.

On 24 August 2005, one C-160 Turkish military aircraft and one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, as follows:

(a) The C-160 Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it later departed towards the FIR of Ankara;

(b) The Cougar Turkish military aircraft took off from the illegal airport of Krini, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied areas of Mesaoria, Ammochostos and Morfou, before returning to the same airport.

On 31 August 2005, one C-130 Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it later departed towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 1 September 2005, one Cougar Turkish military aircraft took off from the illegal airport of Krini, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Morfou, before returning to the same airport.

On 1 September 2005, one Turkish military aircraft of unknown type took off from the illegal airport of Krini, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before returning to the same airport.

On 7 September 2005, one C-160 Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it later departed towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 12 September 2005, two F-16 Turkish military aircraft coming in one formation from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations.

On the same day, two F-16 Turkish military aircraft coming in one formation entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus.

On 13 September 2005, one Cougar Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, and then later at the illegal airport of Krini, where it remained.

On 14 September 2005, one C-130 Turkish military aircraft entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the

Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, from where it later departed towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 17 September 2005, one Twin HU-1 Turkish military aircraft took off from the illegal airport of Krini, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, before exiting towards the FIR of Ankara.

On 19 September 2005, one CN-235 Turkish military aircraft and one Turkish military aircraft of unknown type entered the FIR of Nicosia, violated international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, as follows:

(a) The CN-235 Turkish military aircraft coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, landing at the illegal airport of Tymbou, before departing on the same day towards the FIR of Ankara;

(b) The Turkish military aircraft of unknown type coming from the FIR of Ankara entered the FIR of Nicosia, violating international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Mesaoria, before exiting towards the FIR of Ankara.

On behalf of my Government I would like to strongly protest the aforementioned violations and hereby call for their immediate cessation. The non-observance by Turkey of rules and regulations governing air traffic constitutes a serious threat to the safety of flights and a breach of its international obligations. At the same time, its attempt to upgrade an illegal secessionist entity in the occupied part of Cyprus to the detriment of a sovereign country, Member of the United Nations and the European Union, arrogating to itself the characteristics of a State, constitutes a blatant violation of international law with serious ramifications for the peace and stability of the region.

Instead of promoting a policy of separation and undermining the Republic of Cyprus, Turkey should seek ways of cooperation in finding a mutually accepted and lasting settlement to the Cyprus issue, according to United Nations resolutions, and contributing to the maintenance of stability and prosperity in the region.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 19, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Andreas D. **Mavroyiannis**

United Nations A/ES-10/307–S/2005/608

General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Sixtieth year

Identical letters dated 26 September 2005 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

Over the past couple of days, Israel, the occupying Power, has been intensifying its military campaign against the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. This has included in particular an escalation of overnight air raids and attacks in the Gaza Strip, which has involved the extrajudicial execution of four Palestinians by the Israeli occupying forces in grave breach of international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law.

Today's air strikes in Gaza City, as well as in the southern town of Rafah and Khan Yunis, which knocked out power and caused extensive damage, come on the heels of two other extrajudicial executions in the Gaza Strip. The first illegal extrajudicial execution occurred on Saturday, 24 September 2005, in which the Israeli occupying forces fired missiles from an Israeli warplane at a civilian car, instantly killing two Palestinians and injuring innocent bystanders. This was followed by yet another extrajudicial execution, committed yesterday evening, of two more Palestinians who were also killed in their vehicle as a result of fired Israeli missiles.

Moreover, Israeli warplanes shot missiles at Al-Akram school yesterday, which is situated in the densely populated Tufah neighbourhood, causing destruction to the school and injuring at least 15 Palestinians, many of them children. In addition to such military attacks, the Israeli occupying forces have launched an extensive campaign in which they have arrested and detained more than 200 Palestinian civilians in grave violation of international law. It is important to mention that a number of those arrested are declared candidates intending to run in the local Palestinian elections. Therefore, such illegal Israeli measures are also a deliberate interference in the internal affairs of the Palestinian people, as well as a disruption of the Palestinian democratic election process.

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It seems apparent that Israel, the occupying Power, is intentionally and aggressively escalating its attacks against the Palestinian civilian population in an attempt to ignite the situation on the ground in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Indeed, following the extrajudicial executions carried out yesterday and on Saturday there have been repeated calls for revenge against the occupying Power by many within the Palestinian population. It is unquestionable that these Israeli policies and practices will only continue to fuel the vicious cycle of violence between the two sides, undermining any peace initiative or peace efforts and thus sabotaging any potential for dialogue between the two sides and a real resumption of negotiations.

The Palestinian leadership calls upon the international community to take measures to address the current situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as a result of the ongoing and blatant aggressions being committed by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people. We continue to express our strongest hopes that the necessary measures will be taken in this regard.

The present letter is in follow-up to our previous 220 letters to you regarding the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, since 28 September 2000. These letters, dated from 29 September 2000 (A/55/432-S/2000/921) to 18 August 2005 (A/ES-10/305-S/2005/530), constitute a basic record of the crimes committed by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people since September 2000. For all of these war crimes, State terrorism and systematic human rights violations committed against the Palestinian people, Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable and the perpetrators must be brought to justice.

I would be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Dr. Riyad **Mansour**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations